

# DEFENCE OF THE ESSAY

Human Understanding,

Written by Mr. Lock.

Wherein its Principles with reference to  
*Morality, Reveald Religion, and the*  
*Immortality of the Soul,* are Consi-  
der'd and Justify'd: In Answer to

Some

REMARKS on that Essay.

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ALMA ARKES ON THE 1st DAY

of the month of June 1880  
at the City of New York



**To the Excellent Mr. Lock.**

**SIR,**

Do not presume to address these Papers to you as a Champion in your Cause, but as an Offender, to make the best Apology for a Bold unlicenc'd Undertaking; that Excellence of the Essay of *Human Understanding*, which gave me Courage in encountering a Ca-ter against it, strikes me with Shame and Re, when I think of coming before you; like a rash Lover, that fights in Defence of a Ladies Honour, the juster his Cause is, the more Reason he has to fear her Resentment, for not giving it to assert it self by its own Evidence, the more it secures him of Success against Adversary, the less Pretence he has to her Giveness: But, Sir, The Essay of *Human Understanding* is a Publick Concern, which every Man has a Right and Interest to defend; It came late into the World to be receiv'd without Opposition, as it might have been in the first Ages of Philosophy, before Mens Heads were possess'd with imaginary Science; at least, not, if so Perfect a Work cou'd have been produc'd so Early, it wou'd have prevented a great deal of that unintelligible Jargon, and vain Pretence to Knowledge of things out of the reach of Man Understanding, which make a great part of the School-Learning, and disuse the Mind to plain and solid Truth.

But

But the Great Mr. Lock was reserv'd for a Curious and Learned Age, to break in upon the Sanctuary of Vanity and Ignorance, and by setting Men on considering first the Bounds of Human Understanding, to help them in a close Pursuit of True and Useful Knowledge: And is it possible for a Lover of Truth to be unmov'd, or silently suffer any injurious Insinuations of so Excellent a Design.

Your Time, Sir, is too precious to be employ'd in taking notice of them, you still go on in farther designs for our Advantage and Improvement; and whilst you labour in that Great Endeavour to which you were Destin'd, The good of Mankind, 'tis every one's Duty to be watchful for you, and zealous to secure the Benefits you have already done us.

'Tis confess'd, the vast disproportion between one of so mean Abilities as the Author of this Defence; and the Incomparable Mr. Lock, might with Reason have deter'd from the Attempt. But I did not presume to consider my self in any kind of Comparison with him, I only observed the Adversaries Strength and Thought (with Reason and Justice on my side) I need not be discourag'd to enter the Lists with him; And I am perswaded, what I have done will leave him in the cause of Triumph, how much soever it is unworthy of you: I wish, Sir, you may only find it enough worth your notice, to incite you to show the World, how far it falls short of doing Justice to your Principles, which you may do without interrupting the Great Business of your Life, by that Work that will be an Universal Benefit, which you have giv'n the World some Right

exact of you; Who is there so capable of pursuing to a *Demonstration* those Reflections on the Grounds of *Morality* which you have already made? Which on the Hints you have giv'n, is impatiently expected from you by many who lament the Great Need there is of it in this Age; That Consideration, no doubt, will animate one who has ever shewn a careful Zeal for the Advancement of Practical Religion; and I cannot but think a Man so greatly qualify'd for such an Undertaking, was giv'n in Mercy to an Age in which it is more than ever wanting, for never any Age abounded like this with open Advocates of Irreligion, upon pretended Rational Grounds, To silence these unhappy Reasoners, by a *Demonstration* of the Obligations their Nature lays upon them, is a Work worthy of the Excellent Mr. *Lock*; And perhaps the weakness of this Defence may shew you, that those who mean well to Religion, have no little need of your Instruction; in hopes of which, I have ventur'd to Publish these Papers, not without much Apprehension and Awe of your Displeasure; But Sir, in my Offence you must perceive my Zeal, and tho' I have not the Happiness to be known to you, believe me with the Deepest Respect.

Sir,

Your most Humble,

And most Obedient Servant.

PRE-

# P R E F A C E.

**A**S the Science of true Morality is of the most Universal and highest Concernment to Mankind, no doubt, those Writers who establish it upon the clearest, most obvious, and the most solid Grounds, do the Best Service to Religion, which has receiv'd no little prejudice, by the Attempts of some well-meaning Men to support it upon Metaphysical Notions, upon false or abstruse Reasonings: And as there appears a hearty Zeal for setting Men right in that great Concern, in all the Writings of the Excellent Author of the Essay of Human Understanding, I know no Philosopher before him that has fix'd Morality upon so solid a Foundation, as he gives many Hints of in that Essay, where ever the Subject will permit; A Foundation strong enough to satisfy the Wisest, and plain enough to be conceiv'd by the weakest Capacities. And yet there have not been wanting some, who have tax'd that admirable Essay with Principles prejudicial, or not sufficient to those Great Ends, which are evidently the main Scope of all that Author's Works; So hard it is for Men, who have been us'd to receive Truth in a particular Dress, to know her when strip't of those false Colours and borrow'd Ornaments, with which she is too often disguis'd; at least, this is the worst I wou'd think of such Cavillers, the most favourable Judgment that can be made of them, is that they



## P R E F A C E.

They have either mistaken Mr. Locke's Principles, or the true Grounds of Morality, and write out of too great a Fondness of their own Hypothesis, or Ignorance of his.

But as there are no Reflections so weak or ill grounded, that some or other may not be deceiv'd by, I have met with two or three, who upon reading some Remarks on the Essay of Human Understanding (which fell but lately into my Hands) concluded it contain'd very dangerous Principles, and without farther Examination, condemn'd the Essay, having never read, or as they own'd, very little consider'd it; on which account, several who have a great respect for Mr. Lock, have wish'd he had leisure to answer the Difficulties objected against his Principles by the Remarker; But as I did not think them strong enough to need so great a Hand to remove them, I perswaded my self I might do something towards it, which at first I design'd only for my own satisfaction, and those few Friends who had spoke to me of them, But in examining their Force I found them so much grounded on Mistakes, not only of the Principles the Author contends against, but of the Foundation of those Grand Points he contends for, that it fell unavoidably in my way to make some Reflections upon the True Grounds of Morality, and the danger of establishing a Point of so great Concern as that, and the Immortality of the Soul, upon false or uncertain Hypothesis, which having been frequently attempted, and by well designing Men, made me think it might not be unuseful to publish these Papers; And I hope, whatever may tend to removing any Prejudices against a Book of so great use as the Essay of Human Understanding,

## P R E F A C E.

ing, will be thought of some Consequence to the Publick; and tho' I am far from pretending to have set the Principles I defend in all the Lustre they are capable of, I doubt not, that I have sufficiently shewn the Weakness of the Objections against them, and that all impartial Readers will easily perceive, that whatever is defective in this Defence, can only be imputed to want of Judgment in the Undertaker, equal to the Truth and Justice of the Cause.

## E R R A T A.

**P**age 21. l. 32. dele the. p. 23. l. 12. r. the Versacity of  
their. p. 94. l. 7. r. to Mr.

A  
VINDICATION

Of an

ESSAY

Concerning

*Human Understanding.*

**T**IS happy for Mankind, when Men of an elevated Genius, and uncommon Penetration, have too a truly Noble and Beneficent Nature, above any low particular Ends, and Resolute enough to encounter all the Oppositions they must meet in an unbiass'd search of Truth, from those who having with much pains Imbib'd the Opinions of Reverenced Authors, are unwilling to unlearn all their former Knowledge, to examine what they have been taught for first Principles not to be question'd, and lay aside their Sacred *Ipse dixit*. He who dares attempt against this establish'd Monarchy over Mens Judgments, must be  
B look'd

look'd on as a troublesome and dangerous Innovater, and needs a mighty Force of Reason and generous Courage, to break through all the Prejudices of Men, and free them from a willing Slavery: To that united Force, we owe the excellent Essay on Human Understanding; and to these Prejudices, all the Cavils against it.

When the Light of Truth Shines too clear and strong to be directly Fac'd, the only Shelter for those who would not feel its Force, is to seek for far fetch'd dangerous Consequences, suppos'd Inconsistencies, with Revealed Truths, and Mysteries of Faith, deduc'd by a long Train of Arguments, which engaging in an intricate Dispute, shades them with some pretence, for not Confessing the Splendor of that Truth, they cannot Encounter, Inconsistencies with Reveal'd Truths, when the real necessary Consequence of any Principles being sufficient Proofs against them, how Plausibe soever they appear; But Mr. *Lock* has so well Vindicated his Essay from those imputed to it, by the most considerable of his Opposers, that the rest cou'd only hope to Triumph in his Neglect of their Attempts, who by the help of some Suppositions, and many Mistakes, have endeavour'd to draw an Odium on that excellent Essay.

The Remarker, whom I have now under Consideration, in his first Letter, desires to be inform'd how far all the Prin-



Principles of that ingenious Essay, taken together, will give us a sure Foundation for Morality, Reveal'd Religion, and a future Life, which he does not find that they do; What his Reasons, or rather Difficulties (as he terms them) are, is my design to consider, and endeavour to satisfy. In his second Remarks, he mentions an Answer of Mr. *Lock's*, which I have not Read, but suppose, by what he quotes out of it, that it was rather design'd to shew the weakness of his Objections, than to give a full Answer to them, Mr. *Lock*, perhaps, thinking it sufficient to shew they required none; but I find they are still of weight with the Remarker, his Second and Third Remarks, being only Enlargements upon the same Heads.

I shall therefore Examine them in their Order, taking on each Head the Substance of what I find relating to it in all the three Remarks, that the Answer lying together, may be the more clear, and the better Consider'd, which, I hope, will be done by the Remarker, without Prejudice, as it was Writ, with a design to satisfy him, and in a sincere Love of Truth, to do Justice to a Book which, I think, removes the Obstacles to it, and shews the Method of attaining it clearer and more effectually, and is Writ in an exacter Method than any before, to vindicate it from a Defect in the Foundation of Certainty, in those things

which are of greatest Concern to us, which I doubt not to do, it being clear to me, that whatever we can know at all, must be discoverable by Mr. *Lock's* Principles; For I cannot find any other way to Knowledge, or that we have any one Idea not derived from Sensation and Reflection. But let us see how those points may be establish'd on them, for which the Remarker doubts their Force; and first of Morality, or Natural Religion, of which, he thus begins:

1<sup>st</sup>. R. p. 4. *As to Morality, we think the great Foundation of it, is the distinction of Good and Evil, Virtue and Vice.—— And I do not find that my Eyes, Ears, Nostrils or any other outward Senses, make any distinction of these things, as they do of Colours, Sounds, &c.—— Nor from any Ideas taken in from them, or from their Reports, am I Conscious that I do, or can conclude that there is such a distinction in the Nature of things. In*

2. R. p. 8. *which Words, he says, he thought he had taken in enough to comprehend both Mr. Lock's Principles of Knowledge, Sensation and Reflection, which I should not have thought, but since he owns he design'd them to do so, we will suppose both exprest, and proceed with him. I allow that we may infer from Observation and Reason, that such a distinction is useful to Society, but both Philosophers and Divines, you know, make a more immutable and intrinsic Distinction, which is that I cannot make out from your Principles.——*

*This*

*This I am sure of, that the Distinction, sup-  
 pose of Gratitude and Ingratitude, Fidelity  
 and Infidelity, Justice and Injustice, and such  
 others, is as sudden without any Ratiocination,  
 and as sensible and peircing, as the Differnce  
 I feel from the Scent of a Rose and Asa-fœti-  
 da. One would think here, he were doubt-  
 ing whether upon Mr. Lock's principles we  
 can distinguish Gratitude from Ingratitude,  
 Fidelity from Infidelity, &c. that is, know  
 that breaking a Trust, is not keeping a  
 Trust, &c. which (as all other Moral  
 Virtues, as Mr. Lock has shewn) are a *Es p. 191.*  
 Collection of simple Ideas, received from *s. 14.*  
 Sensation and Reflection; But since he  
 allow'd above, that we can from Obser-  
 vation and Reason, infer such a Distinction  
 to be useful to Society, and by consequence,  
 that we can by them perceive such  
 a Distinction, we will guess his meaning  
 here, to be, that the perception of the  
 Morality and Immorality of these things is  
 as sudden, &c. as the differance he feels from  
 the scent of a Rose, and Asa-fœtida; tho'  
 I do not know what it is, to perceive  
 the Morality and Immorality of these things  
 without any Ratiocination; Justice and In-  
 justice, I think, depend upon the Rights  
 of Men, whether Natural, or establish'd  
 by particular Societies, and therefore to  
 know what they are, 'tis necessary to  
 know what Right is, which sure requires  
 some Reflection; but to know that Injustice is  
 Evil, without any Reflection, seems to me,  
 no more than to know that the term Inju-  
 stice,*

Justice, stands for something that we don't know, which is Evil; unless it will be said that we may know it to be a detaining any one's Right, without knowing what Right is, which will be a very insignificant Knowledge: But if the Remarker means that as soon as he knows what it is to have a Right to a Thing, he perceives, that to detain from a Man what he has such a Right to, is Evil, without any farther Reflection, I understand him, but see not how it can be objected against the force of Mr. *Lock's* principles, being only a perception of the disagreement of these two Ideas, of one Man's having a Right to a Thing, and another's having a Right to take it away: But this only by the way.

Let us now Consider that for which this sudden preception without Ratiocination is brought as a Proof, *viz.* That the Grounds of the Distinction of Moral Good and Evil, is in *the Nature of the Things themselves*, abstract from the good of Society; which is that he cannot make out from Mr. *Lock's* Principles. By which Distinction in the Nature of Things, if he means that without respect to Men, or to Society, tho' Mankind had never been, or never been design'd, Justice, Gratitude, Fidelity, &c. had been Good, and their contraries Evil; I Confess my self incapable of having a Notion of these Vertues abstract from any Subject, to conceive. For Example, that



that it would have been good to be Faithful to a Trust, tho' there had never been any one to Trust, or be Trusted : Nor do I find that the Assertors of this Distinction in the Nature of Things, have any real Idea of them more abstracted than I have, which will appear in Examining their particular Instances ; I will take that which the Remarker <sup>p. 26.</sup> gives, being one of the most uncontested Principles in Morality, *That it is a wicked Thing, for a Man maliciously to kill his Friend, or his Father, or any other innocent Person.* The Truth of this, he says, *seems to him as Clear and Eternal, as any Proposition in Mathematicks;* and it seems to me as Clear, that it cannot possibly be Conceived at all, either True or False, in it self, *i. e.* without any Relation to Man. I desire any one, to try whether he can Conceive it to be an Eternal Truth, That 'tis a wicked Thing, for a Man to kill his Father, or his Friend, tho' there had never been, or design'd to be, such a Thing as Friend, Father, or Man; but whether he can or not, it will still be a Truth as *certain and immutable* as any Proposition in Mathematicks; No Mathematician that I know of, thinks it necessary to establish the immutability of this Truth, That the three Angels of a Triangle, are equal to two Right ones; To affirm that it is true, without any relation to Angels or Triangles, either of these Propositions are sufficient-

ly establish'd, if it is, and always must be true, supposing those things to which it relates, to exist.

2. R. p. 22.

But here the Remarker's Question will be made, Upon what Grounds must it be so? If *Good* and *Evil*, *Virtue* and *Vice*, are not such in their own Nature, they must be so from the *Arbitrary Will* of *God*, and all Things are indifferent, till he declare *This*, or *That*, to be *Sin*, according to his *Pleasure*; That is, he might if he had so pleas'd, have made *Virtue*, *Vice*; and *Vice*, *Virtue*: To which, I answer, That *God* having made *Man* such a Creature as he is, it is as impossible that *Good* and *Evil* should change their respects to him, as that *Pleasure* can be *Pain*, and *Pain Pleasure*, which no one in his Senses will Affirm, and yet, I think, no Body has suppos'd them to be real Existences, independent of any Subject; And if the Relation which Moral Good and Evil has to Natural Good and Evil, were sufficiently observed, there would be as little dispute about the Nature and Reality of *Virtus* and *Vice*: Those who think they are only Notions in the Mind, would be convinced they are as Real as Natural, Good and Evil; all *Moral Good* consisting in Doing, Willing, or Chusing, for one's self or others, what ever is a *Natural Good*; and all *Moral Evil*, in Doing, Willing, or Chusing whatever is a *Natural Evil*, to one's self or others. This, I doubt not,

ot, will appear a full Definition, when  
 try'd by every Instance of *Moral Good* and  
*Evil*, to all who reflect on it; unless there  
 be any who do not place the Perfection  
 and Imperfection, the Advantages and  
 Disadvantages of the *Mind*, in their Ac-  
 count of *Natural Good* or *Evil*; which I  
 believe no Rational Man will own.

And as this unalterable Relation makes  
 the Real and Immutable Nature of Vir-  
 tue and Vice undeniable; so also from  
 hence it is plain, *That the Nature of*  
*Man is the Ground or Reason of the Law of*  
*Nature*; i. e. of *Moral Good* and *Evil*.  
 But if the Remarker will rather have it,  
 that the Nature of these things, is the  
 Reason of the Nature of Man, that they  
 are Essentially in the Nature of God,  
 which is the Rule of his Will, and ac-  
 cording to which he form'd Man; let  
 it be so, as it is unquestionable that he  
 cannot will any thing contrary to his  
 Nature; But however the Moral Attri-  
 butes of God, Goodness, Justice, &c. are  
 in him (who is infinitely beyond the  
 reach of our narrow Capacities) This I  
 say (which Mr. *Lock* has observed of  
 our Idea of their Infinity) that we have  
 no Idea of them, but what carries with  
 it a Respect to their Objects, *the natural*  
*Good or Evil of his Creatures*; and we  
 could have no Idea of them at all with-  
 out Reflection upon our selves; for what-  
 ever is the Original Standard of Good  
 and Evil; it is plain, we have no No-  
 tion

tion of them but by their Conformity, or Repugnancy to our Reason, and with relation to our Nature; and that what according to it we perceive to be good we ascribe to the Supream Being; For we cannot know that the Nature of God is Good, before we have a Notion of Good. it must be then by reflecting upon our own Nature, and the Operations of our Minds, that we come to know the Nature of God; which therefore cannot *be to us* the Rule of Good and Evil, unless we will argue in a Circle, that by our Notion of Good, we know the Nature of God, and by the Nature of God, we know what is Good.

From whence it will follow, that the Nature of Man, and the Good of Society, are *to us* the Reason and Rule of Moral Good and Evil; and there is no danger of their being less immutable on this Foundation than any other, while Man continues a *Rational and Sociable Creature*: If the Law of Nature is the Product of Human Nature, it self (as the Great *Grotius* speaks) it must subsist as long as Human Nature. Nor will this Foundation make it the less Sacred, since it cannot be doubted, that it is originally the Will of God, while we own him the Author of that Nature of which this Law is a Consequence.

If then in *Mr. Lock's* way we can perceive what is Conformable, or not to our own Nature, which cannot be doubted; if by reflecting on our selves



we can come to know there must be a  
 Supream Being, the Source of all others, *ES. B. 4.*  
 which he has admirably shewn; we have *c. x.*  
 a Sacred and Immutable Foundation for  
 Natural Religion on his Principles; This  
 being a plain and infallible Inference,  
 that the Author of our Being does re-  
 quire those things of us to which he has  
 suited our Nature, and visibly annexed  
 our Happiness, which he has made the  
 necessary Motive of all our Actions;  
 for it is inconsistent with that Divine  
 Wisdom, which we see has fitted all  
 other things to their proper and certain  
 End, to have form'd us after such a  
 manner, that if we employ those Fa-  
 culties which he has given us, we can-  
 not but judge that such things are fit  
 to be done, and others to be avoided,  
 and this to no end at all; Much less  
 can we suppose he has design'd us to  
 act contrary to the necessary Motives  
 of our Actions, and Judgment of our  
 Minds, it being a flat Contradiction,  
 that Infinite Wisdom and Power, shou'd  
 form any of his Works so dispropor-  
 tionate to their End.

It will not be much from the pur-  
 pose here to take notice of the Folly of  
 those Men, who think to weaken the  
 Authority of Religion by calling it a  
 Politick Contrivance, establish'd for the  
 good of Government or Society; which  
 is as much as to say, it is the less Obli-  
 gatory, because it is necessary; whereas  
 that

that very thing shews it to be our indispensable Duty, and of Divine Authority, without any Revelation, since the Divine Workmanship, *Human Nature* cou'd not subsist without it; If they cou'd prove it unpolitick or destructive to Society, it wou'd be much more for their purpose, for such a Religion must necessarily be false; nothing can be a *Law to Nature*, which of direct Consequence wou'd *destroy Nature*.

But if any one thinks it better establish'd on the Nature of God, I have shewn how we come to the Knowledge of it in Mr. *Lock's* way, by ascribing to him whatever by its Conformity to our Nature we perceive to be Good; because we see that we cannot admit any Imperfection in the Supream Being, without a Contradiction (which I shall shew in Mr. *Lock's* Way, when I come to the next Head) and having by the *Effect* found out the *Cause*, we may then conclude the Nature of God to be the Arch-Type of ours, because we cannot suppose the most Perfect Being can will any thing contrary to his own Nature; For if he cou'd, the Rule of that Will must be something less Perfect than himself, (for whatever is most Perfect is God) and therefore to will any thing contrary to his own Nature, wou'd be an Imperfection in him, which to admit in the most perfect Being, is a Contradiction. Thus (when

I have more fully shewn how we come by the Idea of Perfection in the Supreme Being) the Remarker may perceive, that we can in Mr. *Lock's* way, arrive to the Original Notion of intrinsic Holiness, into which 'tis ultimately resolv'd, which he is so much concern'd to find, and that I hope will reconcile him to Mr. *Lock's* Principles. 2. R. p. 2.

And if he will attentively examine his own without Prepossession, if he will trace his Idea of God, and of Moral Good and Evil, to their first Source, I believe he will find he has no other Principle of Knowledge than Mr. *Lock*; and that the Mistake lies, in that being taught Truths after they are discover'd, and finding them agreeable to our Reason, we immediately assent to them, without reflecting how they were first found out, and are apt to conclude those things which we find first in our Knowledge, to be the first Principles of Knowledge; tho' they were proceeded to by many Steps and Degrees, and were the last establish'd in the Discovery.

But the Remarker will object that Mr. *Lock* does not establish Morality upon the Nature of Man, and the Nature of God, but *seems to ground his Demonstration upon Future Punishments and Rewards, and upon the Arbitrary Will of the Law-Giver; and he does not think these* 2. R. p. 2.  
the

*the first Grounds of Good and Evil. To which I answer, First, supposing it were so, the question is not what Mr. Lock thinks, but what may be prov'd from his Principles. But secondly, I say that*

2. R. p. 4. *Mr. Lock does ground his Demonstration upon the Nature of God and Man, as will plainly appear by his express words, which are these. The Idea of a*

ES. B. 4. *Supream Being, infinite in Power, Goodness,*  
 c. 3. f. 18. *and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the Idea of our selves, as understanding Rational Creatures, being such as are clear in us, wou'd, I suppose, if duly consider'd and pursu'd, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place Morality among the Sciences capable of Demonstration. Nothing can be clearer than this, and in all those places which the Remarker quotes out of Mr. Lock, where he seems to establish Morality upon the Will of God, and Rewards and Punishments, he is speaking of it as it has the Force of a Law; and the Remarker cannot deny, whatever he thinks, the first Grounds of Good and Evil; or however clearly we may see the Nature of these things, we may approve or condemn them, but they can only have the Force of a Law to us, consider'd as the Will of the Supream Being, who can, and certainly will Reward the Compliance with, and Punish the Deviation from that Rule*  
 which



which he has made knowable to us by the Light of Nature.

But that we can only know these things to be his Will by their Conformity to our Nature, and that therefore they cannot be Arbitrary, I have before shewn; and that he will Punish or Reward us according to our Obedience or Disobedience to it, is a consequence of his Nature; so that, tho' Mr. *Lock* says that the Will of God, Rewards and Punishments, can only give Morality the Force of a Law, that does not make them the *first Grounds* of Good and Evil, since by his Principles, to know what the Will of God is (antecedently to Revelation) we must know what is Good by the Conformity it has to our Nature, by which we come to know the Nature of God, which therefore may be to him the first Ground or Rule of Good; tho' *the Will of God, &c.* can only enforce it as a *Law*.

I cannot here omit to take notice of a Question the Remarker asks on this Subject; How, pray you, upon these Principles, do you preserve the Distinction (that good old Distinction, which it may be you despise) of *Bonum Utile*, and *Honestum*? In your way, either the Parts are Coincident, or *Bonum Utile*, is superiour to *Bonum Honestum*. I'm afraid the Remarker will have hard Thoughts of me, if I should say I do  
not

not like his good old Distinction, and that I think the Parts are Coincident; I know not whether he will have a better Opinion of me, when I tell him I do not mean it in the way which he injuriously insinuates to be Mr. Lock's, but that nothing can be truly Profitable, that is not Honest. However, not to cavil about Words, this I am sure of, that there is no Ground for the Remarkers, Reflection in those Principles which he is dissatisfy'd with, *viz. That morally Good and Evil, is the Conformity or Disagreement of, our Actions to the Divine Law*, which Mr. Lock says is the only true Touch-stone of Moral Rectitude, and that by comparing them to this Law, Men judge of the most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions, that is, whether as Duties or Sins, they are like to procure them Happiness or Misery from the Hands of the Almighty. Upon these Principles *Bonum Utile*, can never be Superior to *Bonum Honestum*, in Mr. Lock's Way, till the Remarker can shew him some Moral Evil, that is not contrary to the Divine Law, or a Way to escape the Hands of the Almighty, when we disobey him.

What has been said, will be sufficient to answer all that the Remarker has said directly on this Point, but what further concerns it, of *Natural Conscience*, and the Proofs of the Moral Attributes

attributes of God will be consider'd in their order, which leads us to the second Head, of which the Remarker.

As to Reveal'd Religion, my Difficulty is 1st. R. p. 6.  
 only this, how it can be prov'd from your Principles, that the Author of the Revelation is veracious; and p. 7. to establish the certainty of Reveal'd Religion, we must know the Moral Attributes of the Divine Nature, such as Goodness, Justice, Holiness, and particularly Veracity. Now these I am not able to deduce from your Principles. You have prov'd very well an Eternal All-Powerful and All-Knowing Being: but, &c. The Remarker, it seems, does not find what Mr. Lock says, after he has very well prov'd an Eternal, most Powerful, and most Knowing Being; That from this idea duly consider'd, will easily be deduc'd 2d. R. p. 3.  
 all those other Attributes we ought to ascribe to this Eternal Being; the Remarker is not able to do it, tho' to help him, Mr. Lock says, he may be asham'd to have rais'd such a doubt as this, viz. whether an infinitely Powerful and Wise Being be veracious, or no, unless he concludes Lying to be a Mark of Weakness, and Folly. As I find which he complains of, as misrepresenting, and perverting his Sense; The Question is not (says he) whether God be veracious, but whether, according to your Principles, he can be prov'd to be so. Answ. But the Question is, whether an Infinitely Powerful, and Wise

*Wise Being, is veracious or no*, for such a Being, Mr. *Lock* has very well prov'd, as the Remarker owns, so that the Doubt must be, whether, as such, he must be veracious; For if the Remarker allows *Veracity* to be a Consequence of *Infinite Power and Wisdom*, the Veracity of God is prov'd by Mr. *Lock*'s Principles; and this is an absurd Question, whether the Veracity of God can be prov'd from his Principles, if *Falshood* is allow'd to be a *Mark of Weakness and Folly*, for then it cannot possibly be admitted in a Being which he has prov'd of *Infinite Wisdom and Power*; and I know no better way of proving any thing, than by proving Principles upon which it cannot be deny'd without a Contradiction; So that Mr. *Lock* has not perverted the Remarker's Sense, for he cannot avoid this Dilemma, Either he concludes Falshood, to be a *Mark of Weakness and Folly*, or he does not; if not, then Mr. *Lock* has rightly represented his Sense; if he does, then this is an absurd Question, whether one who has prov'd an Infinitely Powerful and Wise Being, can prove he is not False.

But this is not sufficient for the Remarker, he is not able to deduce one Attribute from another; Let us see then what is his way to know the Moral Attributes of God, which he tells is this, he ascribes *Veracity* to God, because it is



*a Perfection.* But from what Grounds does he conclude, that whatever is a Perfection must be in God? Will he say, that it is a Principle imprinted on the Mind, without any Reflection; that is, we clearly see that God must be Perfect, we don't know why; or will he not rather say, That the want of any Perfection, wou'd imply either that he does not know what is Best, or cannot attain it, and therefore is inconsistent with Infinite Wisdom, and Power? Or that to suppose there may be a Being of Greater Perfection than the Supream Source of all Being, is a gross Contradiction? I believe, if he reflects attentively on the Progress of the Mind in the Knowledge of God, he will find Perfection is not first in our Notion of him, (as an ingenious Author has shewn) but that having discover'd a first Being, the Source of all others, and what attributes, we must necessarily ascribe to him as such, we perceive that to admit any Imperfection in him, would be a Contradiction to our first necessary Conceptions of him; which Mr. *Lock* has establish'd in his Way, and tells us that from them, all his other Attributes will easily be deduc'd.

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But this will not satisfy the Remarker, unless Mr. *Lock* tells us *what is to be understood by Perfection in his Way; how it is deriv'd from the Senses, and how it*

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it includes *Veracity*. The Remarker is very apt to forget, that Mr. *Lock* has another Principle of Knowledge, which he calls *Reflection*, or he thinks it insignificant; perhaps it may be so as to his purpose, but happening to be serviceable in the present Enquiry, I take leave to remind him of it, that we may consider how far it will help us to the Idea of Perfection.

But first, I observe that we have no adequate Idea of Perfection; but perceiving in our selves some *Powers and Faculties*, as of *Knowing, Willing, Moving, &c.* and of particular Actions, and General Abstract Ideas, that some are congruous; and others repugnant to each other, and to our Reason; we know that some things are better than others; and from every thing about us, and within us, we may learn, that the vastly greater part of them escape the extent of our Power, Knowledge and Goodness, from whence we conclude these things may be far more extensive, ev'n to all that can exist. And the highest possible Degree of these things, which we find it better to have, than to be without, that we call Perfection; which to have an adequate Idea of, we must comprehend the Existence of an Infinite Spirit. But we cannot add any thing to make up this Idea, which we do not find in our selves, only the Degrees, which we perceive must  
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be ascribed far beyond our Measures, to that Being from which we receiv'd all our Powers and Faculties, and by whose Wisdom, Power and Goodness, all things exist; for Perfection is only the highest Degree, or the best Manner of possible Existence, and that the Eternal Source of all Being, must exist in the most Perfect Manner possible, cannot be doubted, for there cannot be a greater Absurdity, than to suppose there may be a more Perfect Being, than the Eternal Source of all Being. Thus we see how the Idea of Perfection, such as we have, may be deriv'd from *Sensation and Reflection*, and any one who considers it, will find, that he has no positive Idea of it, and that there is nothing in that Idea which he has, but what the Objects without him, or the Faculties he perceives in himself, have furnish'd him with; and that therefore it is needless to seek for any other Original of it.

Having now got the Idea of Perfection, in Mr. *Lock's* Way, and found that it must necessarily be ascrib'd to the Eternal Source of all Being, we must next consider the other part of the Remarker's Question, *How it includes Veracity*, which he is the more concerned to know, because he says, *not only the Truth of the Revelation, but also of our Faculties in other things, depends upon the Veracity of their Author.* And here he must

must give me leave to ask him, upon what grounds Veracity is to him a Perfection. He will not say because God is veracious, (tho' the Nature of God, is to him the Rule of Good) for he ascribes Veracity to God, because it is a Perfection, and he does not approve of arguing in a Circle. He must then know that Veracity is a Perfection from some other Rule, and here I am afraid he will be involv'd in a great Difficulty, for *the Truth of our Faculties*, he says, *depends upon the Veracity of their Author*, but before he can know the Veracity of their Author, he must be sure that Veracity is a Perfection, since 'tis only as such he does, or it can be ascrib'd to him; now by whatsoever means he perceives it to be so, how can he be certain that the Faculty by which he receives that Information, does not deceive him? For unless he is certain, that Veracity is a Perfection, he cannot be certain that God is veracious, nor therefore of the Truth of his Faculties; He must then remain in doubt, whether God is veracious, unless he can know it without the help of his Faculties, that is, without the Power or Capacity of knowing it; or he must suppose the Truth of his Faculties without any Proof. If that is not a first Principle not to be doubted of, I see no defence against an incurable Septicism, we cannot argue  
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for, or against any thing, and the Remarker cannot know that his Position is true, viz. That the Truth of our Faculties depends upon the Veracity of thier Author, since he must take it upon the Credit of those Faculties. Let him doubt the Truth of his Faculties as much as he will, if he affirms any one thing, in that one he must believe them upon their own Evidence; and since he could not trust them in other things, till he was certain of their Veracity of the Author; whatever Principle he establishes that Certainty upon, he must rely upon the Evidence of his Faculties for the Truth of that Principle, which he tells us is this, *That Veracity is a Perfection, and consequently must belong to the Nature of God.* 1st. R. p. 7.  
2d. R. p. 18.

For which Propositions we may therefore conclude, he was contented to suppose the Truth of his Faculties; and he cannot deny Mr. *Lock* the same Priviledge, till he can show him some way to Knowledge without their help.

In the mean time there can be but two ways of knowing that Veracity is a Perfection, either it is an innate Principle, originally Imprinted on the Mind; (which I shall not endeavour to confute, Mr. *Lock* having done it sufficiently, nor is it needful to my Purpose.) Let that be the Remarker's Way of Knowledge if he pleases,) since he must no less rely upon the Truth of his Faculties, in that way than  
any

any other, (it being impossible for God himself to make any Impression on us, without giving us a Faculty whereby to receive it.) But let us see whether it is discoverable in the other way, which must be Mr. *Lock's* of *Sensation and Reflection*. I suppose the Remarker does not doubt, that in this way we can distinguish Truth from Falshood, *i. e.* know that things are as they are, appear, as they appear, and that doing a thing, differs from not doing it, that an Apple, for Example is not a Horse, that Pain, is not Pleasure, and that performing our Promise, is not breaking it; or that representing things as they are, or as they appear to us, and performing our Promise, *i. e.* Veracity, is more agreeable to our Nature, and Beneficial to Mankind, than the contrary; which how far *to us* the Rule of Good and Evil, I have before shewn, and shall only add here, that if in Mr. *Lock's* Way we can know, that what is Beneficial to Mankind, is better than what is destructive to it; that Happiness is better than Misery, that Power and Knowledge is better than Impotence and Ignorance; if we may trust our Faculties in discerning Truths, as sensible to us as our own Existence; it cannot be doubted, that in his Way we can be assur'd that Veracity is a Perfection, till some other Reason of Falshood can be imagin'd, than Ignorance, Impotence, or willing Evil for  
its

its own sake, which cannot be conceiv'd possible to chuse or prefer Evil, as Evil, being no less a Contradiction than to judge that to be best, which we know to be Worst.

And the Remarker could not have been at a loss how to deduce this, and all the other Moral Attributes of God, from Mr. *Lock's* Principles, if he had carefully considered his Discourse of our Idea of God, where he shews that it is *made up of the simple Ideas we have received from Sensation and Reflection, by putting together all the Qualities and Powers which we experiment in our selves, and find it better to have, than to be without, and enlarging every one of them with our Idea of Infinity*; to which place I refer the Remarker, and if he can by *Reflection*, find Veracity, Justice, and Goodness, among the things that it is better to have than to be without, I hope (with what I have said) it will help him to deduce those Attributes of God from Mr. *Lock's* Principles; which will satisfy him that they give us a sure Foundation for *Natural and Revealed Religion*; by which we have a full assurance of a future State. The Remarkers Third Head of Enquiries, which we are next to Consider.

That the Immortality of the Soul is only highly probable by the light of Nature, none can deny who believes that Apostle by whom we are told, that Life and Immortality is brought to light by Jesus Christ through the Gospel, Why then is it objected against Mr. *Lock's* Principles, that they give us no certainty of the Immortality of the Soul without Revelation? By what other way can we be certain of any thing that is only highly probable by the Light of Nature? Which is all that can be prov'd by any Principles, and so far Mr. *Lock's* will go, as I doubt not to make appear. But farther I shall shew, that there is

nothing in his Principles, which at all weakens the main Proofs of a Future State, so that if they are thought to amount to Demonstration, they have no less Force and Evidence upon his Principles, which will leave no pretence on this account against them ; as will plainly appear in examining the Remarker's Objections.

*1st. R. p. 8.* You suppose (lays he) that the Soul may be sometimes absolutely without Thoughts, of one kind or other ; and also, that God may, if he pleases (for any thing we know by the Light of Nature) give or have giv'n, to some Systems of Matter a Power to conceive and think. Upon these two Suppositions, I could not make out any certain Proof of the Immortality of the Soul, and am apt to think it cannot be done.

As to the first of these Objections, I confess I do not see of what Consequence it is at all to the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul ; do they depend upon the contrary Supposition, that the Soul *always thinks*? If they do, proofs upon a Supposition have a very unsure foundation ; but let it be granted, that it is ever so clearly prov'd that thinking is necessary to the Souls Existence, that can no more prove that it shall always Exist, than it proves that it has always Existed ; it being as possible for that Omnipotence which from nothing gave the Soul a *Being*, to deprive it of that *Being* in the midst of its most vigorous Reflections, as in an utter Suspension of all Thought. If then this Proposition, *That the Soul always thinks*, does not prove that it is Immortal, the contrary Supposition takes not away any proof of it, for it is no less easy to conceive that a *Being* which has the Power of Thinking with some intervals of Cessation from Thought, that has Existed here for some time in a Capacity of Happiness or Misery, may be continued in, or restored to the same State, in a future Life, than that a *Being* which always thinks, may be continued



in the same State, but to do the Remarker all the Justice, and give him all the Satisfaction I can, I shall examine the Substance of what he has Objected against Mr. *Lock's* Assertion, without entering farther into the Dispute than may serve to shew whether it is of any Consequence for, or against the Immortality of the Soul.

Mr. *Lock* says, *Men do not think in sound Sleep;* and his Reason is, because they are not Conscious of it, and 'tis a Contradiction to say a Man thinks, but is not Conscious of it; thinking consisting in that very thing of our being Conscious of it. Upon which Supposition, the Remarker cannot make out any certain Proof of the Immortality of the Soul.

I suppose Mr. *Lock* did not design it a Proof of the Immortality of the Soul, but let us see whether it weakens any Proof of it, which the Remarker should have shewn, but instead of that proposes Difficulties, which that Supposition involves him in, and begins with this Notable one, *I wonder how you can observe that your Soul sometimes does not think, for when you do observe it, you think. If a Man could think, and not think, at the same time, he might be able to make this Observation.* This revers'd, may be an Argument of some Force indeed, but to conclude that my Soul does not always think, 'tis sufficient to know that there has some time past in which I was not Conscious that I thought; unless we will allow that the Soul may think, when the Man does not, which is plainly to make them two Persons, as Mr. *Lock* has shewn \* P. 44, and 45. in which the Remarker says he does \*not understand what that discourse about the Identity, or non Identity of the same Man, sleeping and waking, and about Castor and Polux, aims at, and tends to. A Discourse about the non-Identity of the same Man, would, I confess, be very hard to understand; but I find no such in that place, or any other of Mr. *Lock's* Essay; he does not trifle at that rate, as to talk of the

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\* Eß. of  
Human 7<sup>n</sup>.

\* 1<sup>st</sup>. R.  
P. 12.

( 28 )  
*same Man's not being the same Man. He say*  
indeed, that if the Soul can whilst the Body is  
sleeping, have its thinking and enjoyments apart,  
which the Man is not at all Conscious of, his Soul  
when he sleeps, and the Man consisting of Body  
and Soul, when he is waking, are two Persons.  
And he farther illustrates the same thing in his  
Discourse of *Castor and Polux*, which if it be  
thought absurd to assert, 'tis not hard to  
find what that Discourse aims at, v. g. to  
shew that such an absurdity will follow from  
this supposition, That the Soul thinks when  
the Man is not Conscious of it. But  
whatever that Discourse aims at, of what  
Consequence can it be to the Immortality of  
the Soul, supposing it does not always think? That  
the Remarker says nothing of. But it will not  
be improper here to take notice of an Inference  
he draws from it in his second Remarks; That  
Mr. Lock does not think the Soul a *Permanent*  
*Substance* distinct from the Body. This (says he)  
seems to be the Supposition you go upon, when you  
question whether a Man waking and sleeping with-  
out Thoughts be the same Man. If there be still  
the same Soul, the same permanent Substance, I see  
no room for that Question, or Doubt, which you  
make. Here the Question is again turn'd, not  
only from the same Person to the same Man,  
but to sleeping without Thoughts, from sleep-  
ing with Thoughts, that he is not conscious of,  
which are very different Cases as to this Que-  
stion, tho' much the same indeed, as to the  
thing it self, but that the Remarker won't al-  
low. But perhaps he takes the Soul, Man and  
Person, to signify the same thing, and so they  
may to him; every Man has the Liberty to make  
his own Words stand for what Idea he pleases;  
but when he argues against the Opinion of an-  
other, he must consider in what Sense those  
Terms are us'd by that other, and in that Sense  
oppose

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oppose him, otherwise he fights with his own Notions, and not his whom he seems to dispute with. And 'tis impossible to read Mr. *Lock's* Essay with the least Attention, and not know that he does not use those three Terms in one and the same Signification; which if the Remarker had consider'd, he cou'd not have so much mistaken Mr. *Lock*, or found such Difficulties in his Discourse. If Mr. *Lock* had understood by the *Soul*, *Man* and *Person* the same thing, he wou'd never have made such a Question, whether the *Soul* thinking apart, what the *Man* is not at all conscioius of, were not a distinct *Person*, from the *Man*; which wou'd be just the same thing as to ask, whether the *Soul* thinking apart, what the *Soul* is not conscious of, be not a distinct *Soul* from the *Soul*: But understanding by *Person* as he does *Self-Consciousness*, and by *Man* the *Soul* and *Body* united, he may question whether the same *Soul*, the same permanent Substance, thinking apart from the *Body*; in sound Sleep, what the waking *Man* is not conscious of, whether that incommunicable Consciousness does not make the *Soul*, and the *Man* consisting of *Body* and *Soul*, two distinct Persons; *Personal Identity*, consisting in the same Consciousness and not in the same Substance, for whatever Substance there is, without Consciousness there is no *Person*; Consciousness therefore and not Substance, making a *Person*, the same Consciousness must make the same *Person*, whether in the same, or in different Substances; and no farther than the same Consciousness extends, can there be the same *Person*, but wherever there is two distinct incommunicable Consciousnesses, there is two distinct Persons, tho' in the same Substance.

But farther, not only Mr. *Lock's* Question, may be made, supposing the *Soul* a distinct permanent Substance, but he cou'd not make it upon  
any

any other Supposition with the least Sense, to his purpose, which is to confute this Opinion, that the *Soul* thinks, in sound Sleep, when the *Man* is not conscious of it; now what manner of Argument I pray wou'd this make?

If the *Soul* thinks when the *Man* is not conscious of it, the *Soul* and the *Man* are two *Persons*!

But the *Soul* not being a permanent Substance, may make two *Persons*, Ergo, The *Soul* cannot think when the *Man* does not, because that makes them two *Persons*, the Sum of which is, the *Soul* cannot think apart, because it can.

But if this Assertion, that the *Soul* and the *Man* are two *Persons*, implies, that it is not a permanent Substance, let those look to it who say, that the *Soul* thinks when the *Man* is not conscious of it, since 'tis only a Consequence of that Supposition, but can no way concern Mr. *Lock*, who denies that Supposition. But the Remarker is to be excus'd for making an inference so inconsistent with the design of that Discourse, since he confesses he does not understand what it tends to, and perhaps only ventur'd at a shrew'd guess to provoke a clearer Account. And indeed, the best Construction I can make of the Remarker's writing against Mr. *Lock*'s Essay, is, that he understands very little of it, so groundless are the Difficulties he makes, and his Consequences so wrong. This I am sure, no Man that means well, if he understands any thing of what Mr. *Lock* says upon this Subject, that *Men* think not always, can from thence infer, that he does not think the *Soul* a permanent Substance, for it is plain, all the Difficulties he finds in supposing the *Soul* does always think, arise only from its being in a sleeping, and waking *Man*, the same permanent Substance. Why else does he find it so very hard to be conceiv'd, that the *Soul* in a sleeping *Man*, shou'd this moment be busie a thinking, and the



*the next moment in a waking Man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those Thoughts? Why, does he think it strange, if the Soul has Ideas of its own, that it deriv'd not from Sensation or reflection, that it shou'd never in its private thinking, retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the Man glad with new Discoveries? Or why does he call it an Absurdity, to make the Soul and the Man two Persons? There is nothing strange or absurd in all this, if the Soul in a sleeping and waking Man be not the same permanent Substance.*

P. 47.

P 45.

I hope what has been said, is sufficient to help the Remarker's understanding in that Discourse of Mr. Lock's which so much puzzled him; and then I am certain he cannot apprehend it of any consequence to the Immortality of the Soul, supposing it does not think, when the Man is not Conscious of it. I now proceed to his second Difficulty:

*I do not understand (says he) how the Soul if she be at any time utterly without Thoughts, what it is that produces the first Thought again, at the end of that unthinking Interval And what then? Must we therefore conclude it cannot be done? If that be a good Argument, we must deny the most common and visible Operations in Nature Do you understand how your Soul thinks at all? How it passes from one Thought to another? How it preserves its Treasure of Ideas, to produce them at pleasure on Occasions? And recollects those it had not in a long time Reflected on? How it moves your Body, or is affected by it? These are Operations which I suppose you are not so Sceptical as to doubt of, nor yet pretend to understand how they are done: And since we are certain that the Soul is affected with all the considerable Changes of the Body, that it is Sick, and in Pain, and unable to perform its Functions, ac-*

1A.R.p.95

cording

ording as the Body is disorder'd, since we so sensibly perceive it to become Drowsy when the Body is so; so many degrees abated of its Action, even to very near not thinking at all, from that intenseness and vigour of Thought it had, and recovers when the Body is refresh'd with Sleep; whatever is the Cause of these Effects, whether some immediate Connexion between them, or an Arbitrary Law of their Union, where is the difficulty to conceive that the same Cause which lulls it almost, shou'd lay it quite to rest and awaken it again with the Body?

2 R. p. 17. But upon this Supposition (says the Remarker) that all our Thoughts perish in sound Sleep, we seem to have a new Soul every Morning. That's a pretty Conceit indeed, but how does this seem? Thus, as he explains himself; If a Body cease to move, and come to perfect Rest, the motion it had cannot be restor'd, but a new Motion may be produc'd. If all Cogitation be extinct, all our Ideas are extinct, so far as they are Cogitations, and seated in the Soul. So we must have them new impress'd, we are, as it were, new Born, and begin the World again. The force of which Argument lies thus, Cogitation in the Soul answering to Motion in Body, as the same Motion cannot be restor'd, but a new Motion may be produced; so the same Cogitations cannot be restor'd, but new Cogitations must be produc'd. Ergo, we seem to have a new Soul every Morning. This may be a good Consequence, when the Remarker has proved that every new Motion makes, or seems to make a new Body: In the mean time, all I can infer from this Parallel, is, That my Thoughts to Day, are not the same numerical Thoughts I had Yesterday, which, I believe, no body supposes they are, tho' they did not suspect they had a new Soul with every new Thought.

But

But if the Remarker thinks, that if all our thoughts cease in sound Sleep, all our Ideas are extinct, and must be new impress; I desire him to consider, when a Sleeping or Waking Man thinks, what becomes of all those Ideas which he does not actually perceive in his own mind, for the mind is capable of taking notice but of very few at once: Must not all the rest by this Argument be extinct? And so we must have them new impress; and are, as it were, New Born when ever we have any Ideas which we have not always actually perceiv'd, *i. e.* every time we pass from one thought to another. This is a sure Consequence, if when all our thoughts cease, all our Ideas must be new impress, unless a Man cou'd actually perceive all the Ideas he ever had at once; for his having only one thought in his mind, can no more keep any other there, or excite any other that it has no connexion with, than if he had no thought at all: I am thinking for Example, in my Sleep, of a Horse; his Beauty, Strength, and Usefulness: Does this thought preserve in my mind, the Idea of a Church, of Happiness or Misery? Or can it help me to any of them, when I have occasion for them? If not, then these Ideas must be new impress when I awake; but if they remain in the Soul when I was only thinking of a Horse, wherever they are bestow'd, it may be presum'd, there is room for that one Idea more without thrusting

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out

out another to give it place ; and when that one is among them, I see no more reason why they must be all new impress, than that the others must have been new impress when I only thought of that one ; unless it be suppos'd, that the Soul has always, just one Idea more than there is place for in the repository of its Ideas ; and if that happen to crou'd in, before another has got out, they will all be stifled together, or fly away for Air.

*Ibid.*

But here the Remarker interposes, *If you say the Ideas remain in the Soul, and need only a new Excitation ; why then, say I, may not Infants have Innate Ideas (which you so much oppose ) that want only Objects and Occasions to excite and actuate them, with a fit Disposition of the Brain ?* By what hath been said, it will appear, That this Argument gains no force from Mr. Lock's Opinion, That *the Soul does not always think ;* since if the Soul does always think, it can perceive but very few Ideas at once ; so that the same Consequence will follow from a Man's having only one thought, as from his having no thought at all ; whether all his other Ideas must be new impress, or remain in the Soul, and need only a new Excitation : This Objection therefore wou'd have been as much to the purpose in any other place, The Remarker might have ask'd, If when a Man thinks only upon one Object, there remain Ideas in the Soul, which he does not perceive to be there ; Why may not Infants have *In-*

*nate*



*nate Ideas*, that want only Occasions to Excite them? This then, having no particular Relation to the Question in dispute, requires no Answer here; but that the Remarker may not think he has entangled Mr. *Lock* with his own Principles; I desire him to consider if these are Parallel Cases: How comes it, That when Objects or Occasions, Excite these Ideas in Children, they do not perceive that they were in their minds before; but consider them as things New, and till then absolutely unknown to them? But when Ideas are Excited in a Man, which he has before receiv'd by Sensation or Reflection, he considers them as things he is acquainted with, and clearly perceives they have been in his mind before. Why does not every thing appear equally New to a Man, which he has, or has not known before; as every Idea does, the first time it is Excited in him? But since, it is certain, That the mind does perceive when any Ideas are Excited in it, that were there before; and that every Idea appears new to it the first time it is Excited; this can be no Argument, that because the Soul is capable of retaining the Ideas it has receiv'd by Sensation or Reflection; that it can Record them for its Use, and Recollect them at Pleasure; therefore, it may have Innate Ideas, tho' it never perceives that it had them, not even when they are Excited in it; for this makes the Cases so far from being the same, that

it is one of the greatest Arguments against *Innate Ideas*, that the mind does always perceive, when the Ideas which are Excited in it, were there before: Besides, how can it be conceiv'd, that *Innate Ideas* shou'd need any Objects to Excite them; and that the mind should never Excite any of them in it self without those Objects; as it often does Excite in it self, the Ideas it receiv'd by Sensation, or Reflection, without the presence of those Objects by which it first receiv'd them; Why then are such Objects necessary to Excite *Innate Ideas*, since the mind has a Power of Exciting Ideas in it self, without the presence of any Object? When the Remarker has shewn the reason of this considerable difference, and prov'd that it does not hinder them from being parallel cases, then we may conclude against Mr. *Lock*, That since the Soul can retain the Ideas it has receiv'd, and excite them at pleasure, tho' it do not always perceive them, therefore it may have Ideas which it never did perceive, nor can Excite in it self, nor when they are Excited, perceive that it ever had them before; and then he can have nothing to say for himself, but must let us enjoy our *unperceivable Ideas*, and be as much the better, and wiser for them, as we can.

But still the Soul may be sometimes without any thought, and yet (for any thing we have heard) not endanger its Immortality. Let us consider the Remarkers next difficulty.

*Besides*

*Besides ( says he ) I am utterly at a loss 1st.R. p.9. how to frame any Idea of a Dead Soul, or 2d.R.p.16. of a Spirit without Life or Thoughts. How a Dead Soul comes in here, I don't know, Can there be no Life, where there is no Thought? I confess that I have hitherto thought that Insects and Plants have Life, tho' I did not suppose that they do always think. He goes on: What is the Soul when she does not think? She must be actually something if she exist: She must then have some Properties, whereby she is distinguished from nothing, and from matter. And again, in the Second Remark, You say the Soul has no P. 14. Extension, nor at certain fits any Cogitation: What can the Soul be then but a certain Power acting in the Body, when the Body is prepar'd for the exercise of it; and ceasing to act when the Body is indispos'd? To which I answer, That it is true, we have no Idea of the Soul but by her Operations; but that is no more a Reason to conclude that she is nothing when she does not operate, than when she does, since we are equally ignorant what the Soul is, when we do think, as when we do not. I ask what is the Soul when she does think? Is she a real permanent substance? What then are her peculiar properties, whereby she is distinguish'd from other substances? If it be said the power of thinking, I ask whether she has any other Properties to distinguish her from Nothing, and from Matter? If not, Then Nothing, or Matter, may have the Power of thinking. This is plain,*

plain, If the Soul has no Essential Properties distinct from Matter, whereby she alone is capable of the Power of thinking, there can be no reason why Matter may not have that Power. If it be said she has other Essential Properties, without which she cou'd not have the power of thinking, when the Remarker has found out what those Properties are, he wil then know what the Soul is, when she does not think; for whatever that Substance is, that has the power of thinking, there is no reason to doubt that it remains the same, when it ceases from that action, any more than there is to doubt that a Body in motion, and at rest, is the same Substance; for we have no clearer Idea of the Substance of Body, than we have of the Substance of Spirit, as Mr. *Lock* has shewn; which Excellent Discourse alone one wou'd have thought sufficient to prevent the least insinuation, that he does not think the Soul a real permanent Substance.

Essay B. 2.  
C. 23.

There is much more reason to conclude, that those do not think the Soul a real permanent Substance, who make this Question, If the Soul has no Extension, nor at certain fits any Cogitation, what can the Soul be then, but a certain Power acting in the Body, when the Body is prepar'd, &c. For from what other Reason can they make it? If the Soul be really something else than a certain Power acting in the Body, what can hinder it from being the same thing when it does not act?  
but



but if it must be nothing when it is not in action, *What then can the Soul be, but a certain Power acting in the Body, when the Body is prepar'd for the exercise of it, and ceasing to Be when the Body is indispos'd? But (to retort the Remarkers words) whether that be a Superiour Divine Power distinct from Matter, as a vis movens, or a Power fastned I know not how to the Body, or upon such and such Systems of Matter; whether I say of these two Suppositions better agrees with this Doctrine, I cannot certainly tell; but either of them destroys the Immortality of the Soul, upon the Dissolution of the Body. I leave the Reader to judge which is most concern'd in this consequence, Mr. Lock, who says that it is not necessary to the Existence of the Soul that it shou'd be always in action; which wou'd be absurd to say, if it be not a distinct permanent Substance; or the Remarker, who thinks the Soul cannot Exist, when it is not in action; which there is no ground to think, if it be a real permanent Substance.*

The Vanity of Men seems to be the great Reason why they have so readily suppos'd, without any proof, that the Soul does always think; for having no Idea of it, but by its operations, we are unwilling to perceive our own ignorance, and loath to part with the only Idea we have of that dear thing which we call self; on this Account the Remarker seems offended with Mr. Lock. *Why (says he) do you affirm or introduce a new and unintelligible* R. P. 16.  
State

*State of the Soul, whereof neither you, nor others, can have any conception? And why is this complain'd of, but that Men are willing to believe they know more than they do? Or how else cou'd they think a State of thinking, without being conscious of it, more intelligible than a State of not thinking at all? Or how cou'd they conclude thinking, which is the action of the Soul, necessary to the Existence of the Soul it self, if they did not make our Knowledge the measure of things, and our not having an Idea of a thing, sufficient to exclude it from Being? I proceed now to the Remarker's last difficulty.*

*1 R. p. 9. Then after all (says he) what security can we have upon this Supposition that we shall not fall into this Sleep at Death, and so continue without Life or Thought? What I have said in the beginning of my Discourse upon this Head, might serve for an Answer to this Objection; but the Remarker by repeating it, Page 12. seeming to lay a great weight on it, I shall consider it more particularly.*

*And First (as I observ'd before) If our Security of a Future State depends upon this, that the Soul always thinks, it has a very unsure Foundation, for there is no pretence of a proof that the Soul does always think; and there are great probabilities that it does not think in sound Sleep, (as Mr. Lock has shewn.) But if the proofs of a Future State, do not depend upon the Souls always thinking, the contrary Supposition*

position cannot lessen our security of it; and that they do not depend upon it, I think needs not be prov'd, no body that I know of did ever offer this Proposition, *That the Soul does always think*, as a proof of its Immortality; and the Reasons we have to expect a Future State, are of such a Nature, that they can receive no force from it, nor lose any by the contrary Supposition: The Remarker on another Occasion, tells Mr. Lock, the grounds of our expectation of *Future Punishments and Rewards* are, that *there is a presage of them from Natural Conscience*; and that *they are deducible from the Nature of God, if we allow him Moral Attributes*. Now it is evident that neither of these two grounds can lose any of their force upon this Supposition, That the Soul does not think in sound Sleep, and will not they secure us that we shall not continue in this Sleep after Death? If not, why does the Remarker mention them as Proofs of a Future State? But if they do prove it, why does he say he *cou'd make out no certain Proof of the Immortality of the Soul, upon this Supposition, that it is sometimes without thoughts*? Since those Proofs he mentions remain in their full force, notwithstanding this Supposition. Thus having shewn, that all the Consequences the Remarker draws from Mr. Lock's Supposition are without grounds, I may with assurance conclude, that it is of no consequence to the Immortality of the Soul, nor does at all weaken any proof of it.

I cannot here forbear taking notice, how little Service they do to Religion, who establish the main Principles of it upon such an uncertain foundation, as the Nature of a thing, of which we are so very ignorant, as we certainly are, of *What the Soul is*. Her Operations we have clear Ideas of, and therefore from our capacity of discerning and chusing Good or Evil; and from the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, which we may certainly know to belong to his Nature; we have very good Arguments, and great probabilities of a Future State of Punishments, and Rewards; such as no considering Man can deny, and within every ones Understanding. But when the Soul's Immortality is said to depend upon such Suppositions as this, *That the Soul always thinks*, or that it is *Immaterial*, what can the consequence be, but to make Men think they have very little assurance of a Future Life, when they find themselves so much in the dark as to those Principles upon which it is establish'd, that the greatest Proofs of them are drawn from our ignorance? As that we cannot *conceive how* Matter should be capable of such and such Powers as we perceive in the Soul; or (as the Remarkers objects) *what the Soul is*, when she is without thoughts.

But cou'd the Immateriality of the Soul be prov'd to be as certain, as it is highly probable, it can never be of good consequence, and may be dangerous, to make that



that the main proof of its Immortality; for this is an Argument of no use to the Generality of Mankind, who want either leisure, or capacity, for such nice Speculations; and if they are convinc'd on other grounds that the Soul is Immortal, it is no great matter whether they think it Immaterial, or no: But if they are perswaded that it cannot be Immortal, if it is not Immaterial, 'tis easie to see of how ill consequence that must be, if the Proofs of the Souls Immateriality shou'd not happen to convince them; as it often falls out by the different cast of Mens Heads, that the same Arguments that are very strong and perswasive to one Man, have no force at all with another, especially in Abstract Reflections. Those therefore who are Zealous for Truth, shou'd endeavour to establish it upon the plainest, and clearest Principles, and such as are most adapted to common apprehensions. This is not the only instance in which I have observ'd, that Truth does not suffer less from those who would maintain it upon false or uncertain grounds, than from those who openly oppose it. I have known several who have been carefully enough Instructed in their Duty, who yet for want of being taught at first, or applying themselves to consider the true grounds of it, have been easily argu'd out of their good Notions, tho' some of them Persons of no mean Capacity; for if the Foundation fail, the best Supestructure will fall, tho'

strong and immoveable, when establish'd upon its proper grounds: And this does not only happen when the Foundation is in it self weak or uncertain, but when Truths are taught upon Principles, which tho' true, and solid in themselves, are not the ground or reason of those Truths; which some have done out of a good Design of rendring the Truths they teach the more Sacred; but every thing stands firmest on its own Foundation; and I believe, if it were rightly consider'd, it wou'd appear, that the reasons of all Moral Truths, are plain and clear, and within the reach of the lowest apprehensions. These things which I have only hinted at, are of great consequence to be thoroughly consider'd by all who have the Instruction of others under their Care, that they may not think they sufficiently acquit themselves of their Duty by inculcating good Maxims, when their Negligence, or *Mistaken Zeal* in teaching the Grounds of them, may at least give too great advantage to those who make it their business to corrupt the *Principles*, as well as the *Practice* of their Companions, which are but too many in this Libertine Age.

This being a Matter of so Universal Concern, I hope I shall be excus'd if I have led the Reader a little out of the way for it. We now return to the Remarker, who after he has repeated his last Difficulty, *i. e. If the Soul be sometimes without thoughts, why may she not be so, thoughtless,*  
and

and senseless, after Death? He adds, 'Tis some comfort indeed that we shall at length return to Life at the Resurrection: But I know not how you explain that; nor how far you allow us to be the same Men, and the same Persons then that we are now. This is a great comfort indeed, and I suppose the Remarker here design'd to make Mr. Lock amend for all the faults he has imputed to his Principles, by owning that they afford us this comfort; but I cannot guess what *That* is which he knows not how Mr. Lock explains: Mr. Lock never attempted that I know of, to explain *How* we shall return to Life, which *That* seems to refer to, nor how far we shall then be the same Men; and he needed not have told him that he knows not how he explains a thing, which he has not explain'd at all: But Mr. Lock has very clearly explain'd how far he allows us to be the same Persons, Consciousness according to him, as far as it is extended, makes the same Person, in which he says is founded all the Right, and Justice, of Reward, and Punishment, Happiness, and Misery; and thus he says, we may without any difficulty conceive at the Resurrection, the same Person, tho' in a Body not exactly in make or Parts the same he had here, the same Consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it; which may be sufficient to satisfy the Remarker how St. Peter at the Resurrection will be the same; and how Mr. Lock conceives the

Eff. B. 2.  
C. 27.

Ibid. S. 15.

vid. 2 R.

Resurre- p. 15.

Rep'y to  
the Bishop  
of Wor-  
cester,  
p. 182.

2 R. p. 15.

1 R. p. 13.

Resurrection, as far as is reveal'd of it, and to all its ends and purposes, which is our *Happiness, or Misery*; further than this he does not pretend, nor are we concern'd to know; and I think in a Matter which can only be known by Revelation, no Man ought to determine, or enquire farther than the Holy Spirit has thought fit to reveal. Mr. *Lock* knows too well the Vanity and Presumption of such an Attempt, to offer at it. 'Tis enough (says he) that every one shall appear before the Judgment Seat of Christ, to receive according to what he had done in his former Life; but in what sort of Body he shall appear, or of what Particles made up, the Scripture having said nothing, but that it shall be a Spiritual Body rais'd in incorruption, it is not for me to determine. The Remarker must be contented to walk in the dark as to these things, tho' he says he does not love it, since there is no way to have farther Light in them than the Scripture has given; and if he thinks Mr. *Lock's* Doctrine of the Soul obscure, because he does not pretend to be certain by his Natural Faculties, of things which they cannot certainly discover, (a way to Knowledge which some are very fond of,) I believe Mr. *Lock* will be content not to be understood by him, rather than write what he does not understand himself, to appear intelligible to others.

The Remarker next proceeds to the Second Supposition, which he thinks weakens



weakens the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul, viz. *That God may give, or have given, for any thing we know, to some Systems of Matter, a Power to perceive, and think;* and here one wou'd expect he shou'd have shewn how this Supposition weakens the Proofs of the Soul's Immortality; but all his Objections are against the probability of the Supposition, and to shew the difficulties of conceiving how Matter shou'd have such a Power; which he enlarges upon in his 3<sup>d</sup> Remark, and has several Pages to that purpose, for what reason I know not, since Mr. *Lock* allows it to be highly probable that the Soul is Immaterial, but where he is speaking of Demonstration, only says that 'tis not *impossible, for any thing we know, that God may give, or have given, to some Systems of Matter, dispos'd as he sees fit, a Power to perceive and think.* But my Design being only to vindicate Mr. *Lock's* Principles from the dangerous Consequences imputed to them by the Remarker, I shall not enter into that Dispute; and I think Mr. *Lock* has said enough in his last Additions, to silence the Triumph of such sort of Arguments, drawn from *the unconceiveableness of something in one Hypothesis*, which cannot be a proof of the contrary Opinion, in which there are things altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from our comprehension. All the Demonstration we can have from such difficulties, is of the weakness and scantiness of our Knowledge, which

which should not make us forward in determining positively on either side, much less to establish the Immortality of the Soul on so uncertain a foundation, which is a Consideration I have before insisted on, and I cannot but think Mr. Lock has done much more Service to Religion in that Discourse, B. 3. C. 4. where after he had said that he sees no contradiction in it, that Omnipotency should give to certain Systems of Matter, a Power to perceive and think, tho' it be most highly probable that the Soul is Immaterial; he adds, that if our Faculties cannot arrive to Demonstrative certainty about it, we need not think it strange, all the great Ends of Morality and Religion are well enough secur'd, without Philosophical Proofs of the Souls Immateriality; since it is evident that he who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible, intelligent Beings, and for several years continu'd us in such a State, can and will restore us to the like State in another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has design'd to Men, according to their doings in this Life; and therefore 'tis not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or t'other, as some over-zealous for or against the Immateriality of the Soul, have been forward to make the world believe. These are Mr. Lock's words, and I appeal to all unbiass'd Men, whether he does not better secure the belief of a Future State, by establishing it on such grounds as give an equal assurance of it whether the Soul is Immaterial, or no; than

Vid. The  
Fourth Edition.

than those who take pains to persuade Men that a Future State is less certain, if the Soul is not Immaterial.

But besides the uncertainty and danger of this Argument which I have before taken notice of, The uselessness of it to the generality of Mankind, sufficiently shews, that it cannot be the foundation of the belief of a Future State; That it is not so to the Eastern Pagans at this day, we have the Evidence of a \* Judicious Author, \* Loubere both from the information of the Missionaries who have been longest among them, <sup>du Royaume de Siam.</sup> and his own Conversation with them, who tells us that they believe the *Immortality* of the Soul, but have no notion of its *Immateriality*; and that they only suppose it of a *Matter* subtil enough to escape being seen or handled. And that many of the Old Philosophers who expected a Future State, had no thoughts of the Souls being *Immaterial*, any one must observe, who has read them with attention. And I believe, if well examin'd, it will appear that those among them who had a Notion of the Soul's being Immaterial, did not believe its Immortality upon that Foundation, but only sought an explanation how the Soul by its own Nature might be capable of that Immortality, which they found great Reason to hope for, on other Grounds much more firm and persuasive.

H

But

But what is yet more considerable, were this proof of the Souls Immortality, as certain and as universally receiv'd as any self-evident Proposition, it wou'd not at all serve to the chief end of our assurance of the Souls Immortality, *viz.* The expectation of Rewards and Punishments in a Future State according to our doings in this Life; without which 'tis no matter whether we think the Soul Immortal or no; and this we cou'd never have by the most attentive consideration, and the clearest knowledge of what kind of substance the Soul is; It must be establish'd on far different Grounds, such as the consideration of our selves as Rational and Free creatures, of which we have an Intuitive, Infallible perception; and of an Omnipotent Being, from whom we are, and on whom we depend, of which we have a Demonstrative knowledge within every ones understanding to whom it is propos'd; and if the Consequences drawn from them are not sufficient to assure Men of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, as the clearest proofs of the Souls Immortality can signifie nothing without them, so neither can they add any force to them, and therefore are of no use to the Great Ends of Morality and Religion: For suppose to convince an intelligent Heathen, who thought the Soul Material, and doubted of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments, Arguments were us'd to prove the Soul in its own Nature undissol-

vable,



vable, and that therefore it must remain after Death; he might then reasonably enquire in what State it remains, how he may be sure that it is in a State of Rewards and Punishments, and that it does not return to the Universal Soul of which it may be an Effluence; or inform the next parcel of Matter it finds fitted for it, as some Philosophers have thought. This it is plain must be still in doubt to him, notwithstanding those Proofs of the Soul's Immortality; and Arguments of another nature must be us'd to satisfy him in this Point, whatever may be most proper to work on his Understanding. Suppose those I have before hinted at; That 'tis reasonable to think that the *Wise and Just* Author of our Being having made us capable of *Happiness* and *Misery*, and given us Faculties of discerning and chusing *Good or Evil*, design'd we should be accountable for our Actions, and *Happy*, or *Miserable*, according as they are conformable, or not, to that Law which he has establish'd in our very Natures, that his Will might be certainly known to us; and since it is visibly not so, in the ordinary course of his Providence, but all things happen alike to the Righteous, and the Wicked, in this World, 'tis most consonant to Reason to think this is only a State of Probation, and that the dispensation of Rewards and Punishments, is reserv'd for a Future Life; there being no other way to reconcile the partial distribution of things here, to that

order which we know is agreeable to the Divine Will, by the conformity it has to our Reason, which is a Ray of his own Wisdom. We will suppose the Heathen convinc'd by these Arguments, or others to the same purpose, that he owns it is highly reasonable to conclude there must be a Future State of Rewards and Punishments; but he does not so well digest the Soul's being Immaterial, he has no notion of a Substance without any Extension. Suppose then the *Remarker* should tell him, as he does Mr. *Lock*, If the Soul is not *Immaterial*, there can be no certain proof that it is Immortal. And I desire him to take this Dilemma for the Heathen's Answer: Either the Arguments by which I have been convinc'd that there will be Punishments and Rewards in a Future State are Proofs of it, or they are not; if not, then tho' the Soul should be Immortal, I have no assurance that it will be in a state of Rewards or Punishments; and if they are Proofs of a Future State, then a Future State is equally certain, tho' the Soul be not Immaterial, since that does not make it less consonant to the Justice and Wisdom of God, nor less within his Power. I believe the *Remarker* will find he has no way to solve this Dilemma, but must either give up the certainty of Rewards and Punishments, or the necessity of thinking the Soul is Immaterial; to prove a Future State, and I desire him to establish the Belief of Rewards  
and

and Punishments in a Future State, on any Arguments that will not be equally conclusive, whether the Soul is Immaterial or not.

This then is evident, that Mr. *Lock's* Supposition that God may have given (for any thing we know) to some Systems of Matter, a Power to perceive, and think ; does not at all weaken any proof of the Soul's Immortality, that can be of use to the Great Ends of Religion, for which alone we are concern'd to know that the Soul is Immortal. And perhaps the insignificancy, as to those Ends, of our knowing what kind of substance the Soul is, may be the reason we are left so much in the dark about it. Our Wise Maker has proportion'd our Faculties only to our Necessities, and has made his Will known to us by a Light of Nature clear enough to render any one inexcusable who does not follow it ; tho' the full assurance of an Eternal Retribution, is only given us by *Jesus Christ, who has brought Life, and Immortality, to Light, through the Gospel*, which I have already shewn that Mr *Lock's* Principles give us a sure foundation for, both of Natural, and Reveal'd Religion : So that I think no more remains to clear the Remarker's difficulties, his doubts of *Natural Conscience*, (which is the chief Subject of his 3<sup>d</sup> Remark) being easily resolv'd from what has been already said. But the *Remarker* being a little unlucky at drawing Inferences from Mr. *Lock's* Principles,

ciples, I will give him some help in his enquiry what *Natural Conscience* is, according to them.

- 3 R. p. 5. But first, I must take notice of a Cavil he begins with at Mr. *Lock's* defining Conscience to be nothing else but *our own Opinion of our own Actions*, without expressing what sort of Actions are the Subjects of it. Now any one who reads that part of his *Essay*, will find that Discour-
- B. 1. C. 3. sing of *Innate Practical Principles*, he all along mentions only such Actions as are to be refer'd to Moral Rules, and that he had no reason to apprehend being misunderstood, or that it could be suppos'd he included any other sort of Actions, no other being at all to the purpose in that Qtestion.

- Before I proceed to speak of what I think the true Notion of Natural Conscience, of what Authority, and of what Use it is ; it will be fit to consider what the *Remarker* says he understands by it, which he next proceeds to tell us, but defines it more particularly in another place
- 3 R. p. 7. thus : *A Natural Sagacity to distinguish Moral Good, and Evil ; or a different perception and sense of them, with a different affection of the Mind arising from it ; and this so immediate as to prevent and anticipate all External Laws, and all Ratiocination.* This he says he takes to be the *Foundation of Natural Religion*, without which he does not know how it can subsist ; tho' he approves of Mr. *Lock's* Account of Natural



Natural Religion so far as it goes. You place *Natural Religion* (says he) *I think in the belief of the Being of a God, and of Obedience due to him. This is good so far as it goes, and is well supported. But the Question is, what Laws those are that we ought to obey, or how we can know them without Revelation, unless you take in Natural Conscience for a distinction of Good and Evil, or another Idea of God than what you have given us.* Having already anticipated this Doubt, by shewing how the Moral Attributes of God are deducible from Mr. Lock's Principles, and how we know what his Will is, by the conformity or repugnancy of things to our Reason, and with respect to Humane Nature, of which he is the Author, I need not give a particular Answer to this Question: But since the *Remarker* lays so great a stress upon his *Principle of Natural Conscience in that Sense and Notion* which he has given of it, that he takes it to be the *Foundation of Natural Religion*, and thinks the distinction of Good, and Evil, is manifested, and supported by it; let us farther consider it. P. 5.

It would be too tedious to repeat all that the *Remarker* says on this Subject, from the beginning of his Third Letter to the 16th Page; I need only hint at some Observations, by which it will appear, that he has not settled in his own Mind a determinate Idea of his *Principle of Natural Conscience*, but argues for it sometimes in one Sense, and sometimes in another; that P. 4, & 5.

Mr. Lock

Mr. *Lock* is not at all concern'd in the greatest part of his Argument; and by which the weakness of the whole will be obvious to every Reader.

P. 8.

After his Definition, he gives us a notable illustration of his Principle in the Soul of distinguishing *morally Good and Evil*, without Ratiocination, by the Power we have of distinguishing *sensible qualities* without Reflection, or Ratiocination. He might every whit as well have told us, that since we have a Power of distinguishing *Moral Relations*, without making use of our Eye-sight, we may distinguish Red, and Yellow, without Eyes; they being no more the proper and only inlets of our Ideas of Colours, than reflection is of moral distinctions; which the Remarker says we may have without Reflection, since we can distinguish Colours, and other sensible qualities without Reflection. But if this were so, Mr. *Lock* may very well say what the Remarker believes he will not, That then Children would be able to distinguish Moral Good and Evil, for they very clearly distinguish all the Objects of Sensation that come in their way; and this Principle cou'd never be *improved*, or *corrupted*, as no one can be perswaded that any Sensation he has is more or less agreeable, or that a disagreeable Sensation is an agreeable one; which if we cou'd, it is evident that our Senses wou'd not be sufficient to their End, to give us notice of what is convenient,

*Ibid.*

nient, or inconvenient to the Body. And it is reasonable to think if there were such an inward sensation design'd, as the Remarker says, to direct us as to what is good or hurtful to the Soul, it wou'd operate as constantly as those others do; no Man cou'd prefer Vice to Vertue, any more than he can Pain to Pleasure; otherwise it wou'd not answer the end it was design'd for.

Another thing to be observ'd is, that most of the Remarkers Arguments were anticipated by Mr. Lock, tho' he takes no notice of the Answer to them, as to the same purpose we were now upon, Mr. Lock having own'd that there are natural Tendencies imprinted on the minds of Men, and that from the first instances of sense, and Perception, there are some things grateful, and others ungrateful to them; the Remarker takes occasion from thence, to desire he will grant such a-like impression on the Soul, with reference to moral Good and Evil, as a Rule or direction to our actions; tho' Mr. Lock there says, that those impressions he speaks of, are so far from confirming the like, with relation to moral Good and Evil, that this is an argument against them; since if their were any such impressions, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge; as we do those others on the will and appetite, the desire of Happiness, and aversion for Misery, continuing (as Innate Practical principles ought) to influence all our actions without ceasing; and are in all Persons, and all Ages,

P. 9.

Eff. B. 1.  
C. 3. S. 3.

*steady and Universal.* But this the Remarker  
 3<sup>d</sup> R. p. 11. takes no notice of. In another place he  
 argues that exorbitant practices against  
 Natural Conscience, are no proof that  
 Eff. B. 1. c. there is no such Principle; which Mr. *Lock*  
 3. grants, nor does he contend against a *Natural*  
*Rule*. But the generally allow'd  
 breach of a Rule any where, he says, is a  
 proof that it is not *INNATE*, which he  
 had given instances of in several Nations.  
 This objection not being easily answered,  
 the Remarker chuses rather to oppose an  
 Argument which Mr. *Lock* does not use, but  
 on the contray owns that it is none. But  
 3<sup>d</sup> R. p. 14. any one who considers what Mr. *Lock* ob-  
 jects, will easily see to how little purpose  
 the Remarker takes so much pains to shew  
 that the same Arguments which he brings  
 against *Innate Principles*, may be us'd to  
 prove that the Law of Christianity, is  
 not known among Christians; for besides  
 the great difference of an *Innate Law*,  
 which Men must always carry about with  
 them, from any other that they may avoid  
 reflecting on, or misunderstand; the case  
 of Christians acting against a known Law,  
 cannot be the same with that which  
 Mr. *Lock* represents, unless the Remarker  
 can shew any Christians, who constantly, with-  
 out the least remorse, or shame, offend against  
 that Law which they believe; and that all the  
 by-standers, even Law-makers, and Govern-  
 ers, silently connive at it, nay affirm that it  
 is their Duty to do so: For this is the Case  
 of those Nations which Mr. *Lock* menti-  
 ons.



ons. But the Remarker has a shrew'd objection against this Argument; They are *Barbarous Poople*, he says, and he excepts against them for witnesses, as *Persona Infames*. I find, if Mr. *Lock* wou'd convince him that there are no *Innate Principles*, he must shew him some polite Nation where the People have diligently, and rightly imploy'd their Faculties, and yet are ignorant of the Law of Nature; this might be requir'd, if Mr. *Lock* deny'd a Law of Nature, knowable by our Natural Faculties; but to prove what he affirms, that this Law is not knowable to Men, but by their making a right use of their Faculties, 'tis sufficient to shew that there are Men, who are absolutly ignorant of the clearest Principles of that Law. No, says the Remarker, they are Barbarous ignorant People; and therefore, are no good Witnesses, that there are no Innate Principles. But are they not Men I pray? What is it then that makes them more Barbarous, or Ignorant than others, but their not having made a right use of their Natural Faculties? this is Mr. *Lock*'s argument, that their are no Innate Principles, since some Nations, for want of making a right use of their Faculties, are so *Barbarous*, or *Ignorant*, as to have no Notion of the clearest of those Principles which are esteem'd Innate. To which the Remarker's objection, That they are a Barbarous People, not fit to be admitted for witnesses, is indeed very extraordinary. If he pleases to consider

what he means by *Barbarous*, and what is the cause that these People are so; I believe he will better see the force of Mr. *Lock*'s Argument, and allow them to be very good Witnesses in this case, tho' perhaps he might with reason except against them at the Bar: All he is desir'd to take upon their Credit is, that Men do not know their Duty without making a right use of their Natural Faculties; and that therefore there are no *Innate Principles*, or *none to any purpose*, since they do not operate till Men by Reflection discover that Law which is to be the Rule of their actions. To prove this, Mr. *Lock* mentions some vitious practises approv'd in several Nations; which the Remarker calls *raking up their dirt and filth, to throw in the Face of Humane Nature*. It shews Men, indeed, that they shou'd not idly, or rashly take up with the first Notions they meet with, but employ their Faculties in the Best manner they can, which God has giv'n them to attain the knowledge of their Duty, which they can only be ignorant of by their own fault. But what *indignity* this can be thought upon *Mankind*, or what *piece of Ingratitude to our Maker*, I believe no body but the Remarker can apprehend.

P. 11. He next proceeds to mention some Virtuous Actions of Heathen States, contrary to their interest, and yet done with general applause, as a proof of Natural Conscience. They are indeed proofs of a  
Law

*Law of Nature*, which Mr. *Lock* is no less an advocate for than he, tho' he denies *Innate Principles*, which leads me to a very material observation, which is, that throughout this whole Discourse, the Remarkers uses indifferently, as Terms of the same signification, *Law of Nature*, *Natural Conscience*, *Innate Principles*, *Innate Powers*, and *Natural Principles*, which all signifie very different things; and of which Mr. *Lock* has only denied *Innate Principles*; which consider'd it will appear that he is very little concern'd in the greatest part of this dispute. But I shall only instance two or three places particularly, as where he argues, that *Universal consent is not necessary to declare a Principle to be Natural; for the sense of Musick, of Beauty, of Order, and Proportion, are Natural to Mankind, tho' some Men are not at all affected with them. Ev'n the Power of Reason, (says he) several Passions, &c. appear sooner in some than others; and if you allow these Principles to be Natural, and Born with us, I know not why you shou'd make such ado about the word Innate. If you allow none at all, not these last mention'd, nor so much as willing or nilling, this or that, the controversie will be chang'd; and I desire to know what Idea you can form of a Soul without any Powers, or any Action.* Now here it is plain, that by *Natural Principles* is only meant *Powers* or *Faculties* of the Soul, which is a very different sense from that in which Mr. *Lock* denies any *Principles* to be *Innate*, tho' he does not deny them to be *Natural*;

*Vide. p. 94*  
9. 12.

*Natural*; But in this sense of them he will make no a-do about the word *Innate*; if the Question be whether there are *Innate Powers* or *Faculties* in the Soul, the controversy will not be *chang'd*, for there will be no controversy at all; Mr. *Lock* only contends against those who say there are Principles of Metaphysical or Moral Truths Originally imprinted on the mind; by which, if they only mean that there is an *Innate Power* or Capacity in the Soul of knowing those Truths, they mean nothing different from Mr. *Lock*, who denies *Innate Principles*; for he does not deny that there is a Power in the Soul of perceiving, and assenting to those Truths, or of distinguishing Good and Evil; tho' he is not so ready at it as the Remarker, without employing his Faculties about it, or without Ratiocination: So there is no occasion for him to form an *Idea* of the Soul without any Powers, nor for that supposition which with a seeming charitable wish, the Remarker wou'd so groundlessly fasten on Mr. *Lock*.

P. 13.

The next place I shall mention, where *Innate Principles*, and *Natural Principles*, are us'd in the same sense, and both only for *Powers* or *Faculties* of the Soul, is Page the Fifteenth, where he pretends to answer a *Dilemma* which Mr. *Lock* proposes concerning *Innate Principles*. But any one who takes the pains to consider what he there says, will find that he uses those Terms in a quite different sense from that which



which Mr. Lock understands by *Innate Principles*; and that, therefore Mr. Lock is not at all concern'd in that Argument: Neither is it any thing to the Remarkers purpose of establishing *Natural Conscience* in his own sense and notion of it, if we may take it from his Definition, *Page 7.* but, indeed, his uncertain use of these, and those other Terms I have mention'd, makes it very difficult to know what he means by his *Principle of Natural Conscience*; for those *Principles* which he here affirms to be *Innate*, are Powers of the Soul, the Exercise of which, he says, is *Conditional*, and depends upon the *disposition of the Body, Culture, and other Circumstances*; which as they are very different from those *Principles* which Mr. Lock denies to be *Innate*; so are they also from the Remarkers *Principle of distinguishing in Moral Cases without Ratiocination, sufficient for a general direction of our Lives, and the foundation of Natural Religion.* For how can it be sufficient for those Ends, if it depend upon contingent *Circumstances*? Or how can the Exercise of a Power of distinguishing things without *Ratiocination*, depend upon any *Culture*, or be hindered by *contrary Principles*, as, he says, this Power may? For by *Culture* here must be meant a *Right Instruction, or Right Reflection*; and by *contrary Principles*, false Maxims, or Opinions, (tho' in the same place he uses that Term in a quite different sense, for *Powers of the Soul*) which are all acts of *Ratiocination*; and

P. 16.

P. 5, 8, 9.

P. 16.

and therefore to say that the *Exercise* of this Power depends upon them, is the same thing as to say, that the Power of distinguishing things *without Ratiocination*, depends upon *Ratiocination*. Which, if the Remarker understands, I believe he will hardly make it intelligible to any body else.

*Ibid.*

From all these Observations compar'd, and rightly apply'd, it will plainly appear that Mr. *Lock* is very little concern'd in this Discourse, which, the Remarker says, is in defence of Natural Conscience, against whom I know not, the most part of it being Arguments for things which Mr. *Lock* no less *affirms* than he, tho' he appear to oppose *him*, by using Mr. *Lock's* Words in a different sense from that which he understands them in; and those Arguments by which the Remarker really does oppose him, being anticipated, and fully Answer'd in Mr. *Lock's* Essay.

P. 8.

And from the inconsistency of his Definition of *Natural Conscience*, with his illustrations of it in several places, and his loose and undetermin'd use of those Terms which are of greatest consequence in this Discourse, I must take leave to conclude, that he has not fix'd in his own Mind a clear Idea of that Principle which he contends for; tho' he thinks he has given *Rules, and Marks*, by which it may sufficiently appear to others what he means by it; and therefore by those *Marks* I will endeavour a little to clear his own  
Notion

Notion to him; and for his satisfaction to establish what I think Natural Conscience is, according to Mr. *Lock's* Principles, and in the true Notion of it; tho' Mr. *Lock* is without reason brought into this Dispute, as is evident from the Remarkers own words; *I do not remember* (says he) *that in this sense you have once nam'd Na-* 3 R. P. 5.  
*tural Conscience in your Book*: Why then I pray are so many Arguments us'd, as if he had writ a whole Book against it? By what Rule is a Man concluded to deny every thing that he has not affirm'd? But the Remarker is not the first who has thought this good Logick, and fair dealing against Mr. *Lock*; whatever he writes next, if it shou'd be of *Gravitation*, or the *Motions of the Planets*, I think he wou'd do well to put the Articles of his Religion at the end of it, for fear he shou'd be accus'd of having none, if his Book shou'd not happen to name any.

But as to *Natural Conscience*, I desire the Remarker to examine whether that *Principle* he speaks of, or (as I had rather express it here, as less Equivocal) that *Power* of distinguishing in Moral things *without Ratiocination*, be not a consequent of a *previous Ratiocination*, or instruction; by which, having got some clear or *confus'd* Ideas of Good and Evil, a different affection of the Mind constantly arises from them, and this so immediate, as that it may be truly said to be *without Ratiocination*; from which, the mistake

may come, that it prevents, or is *before any Raticionation*, tho' it is really an effect of it, only operating without taking notice of its cause; as in other Cases, the likings or aversions of the Mind, to things, or Persons, may be observ'd to do, which having been at first produc'd by some outward Cause, some Good, or Evil, we have found, or heard, or apprehended of those Things, or Persons, the same affection constantly exerts it self at their presence, without any reflection on the Cause, or perhaps the least sense that it ever had a known Cause.

And this sudden affection in Moral Cases, is indeed of excellent use, when it is once *set on work by an enlightned Judgment*, to keep up the distinction of Good and Evil, to incite, or to be a check upon Mens Actions, in the heat of a Temptation, when they have neither time nor power to reason the Case, or to reflect upon the Instructions have been given them; and *thus* may be truly call'd *the Support of Natural Religion*; or as the Apostle says, *a witness accusing or excusing those who have no other Law but that of Nature*; but must not therefore be taken for the Law it self, or as the Remarker calls it, *[the Foundation of Natural Religion]*, but rather *Natural Religion for the Foundation of it*; and then it may with safety be rely'd on. Therefore Philosophers, and Divines, having mostly writ for such as have had in some measure a knowledge of their  
their



their Duty, do with good reason give great Authority to this Witness, and frequently send Men to consult their Consciences, as if it were the Original Rule, and an Infallible Director; for it is not easily perverted, or silenc'd, when once rightly set on work; and has a great influence on Mens Actions, nothing being more insupportable, than to stand condemn'd in our own Judgments; or more delightful, than the approbation of our own Minds; and therefore this Monitor may prevail, when our Passions have misled or silenc'd Reason; - or the hopes of escaping Future Punishments made us for a while secure.

But Powerful and Faithful as this Witness is, since it may by false Opinions, or vicious Habits, take a wrong Bias, (which the greatest Assertors of its Authority confess,) and is always set on work by the first Perswasions which happen to take possession of Mens thoughts, since it does not direct their Opinions, but is influenc'd by them; this not only shews that it is not design'd for the Original Rule, and first Director of our Actions, or the *Foundation of Natural Religion*, but that it is of dangerous Consequence to lay the whole weight of Morality upon Conscience alone, independent of the occasions from which it has taken the first bent. For no doubt there are too many who by an unhappy early Education, pursue with the same bent of Con-

science, or without the least remorse, what others (who have been better taught) abhor. Now in this Case, to bid these Men appeal to their Consciences, as an Innate Guide, that will infallibly direct them in their Duty, can only serve to confirm them in their prejudices, and to make them go on securely in their Vicious Habits, without farther Examination, when they find themselves acquitted by that inward sense, which they are taught to Revere as the impression of God himself. That this may be the Case of many is not deny'd by the Remarker ;

3 R. p. 10. *We do not conceive (says he) Natural Conscience such a Light as may not be dimn'd,*

P. 15. *or it may be extinguish'd in some People,* and in another place appeal with sincerity to your Conscience ; if that be obscur'd, perverted, or fear'd, we cannot help it. These

P. 16. *Principles of Conscience are Seeds that may Die, or may Thrive, &c. they may be weak in some, and ineffectual in others, by contrary Principles, or other Impediments.* This being granted, it is evident that those People in whom these Principles happen to be *extinguish'd*, or *perverted*, will in vain appeal with sincerity to their Consciences ; there is no way to set them right but by rectifying their Judgments ; they are to be warn'd not to trust to so dangerous a security, and to be convinc'd of their Errors, and their obligations, on Rational Grounds.

I appeal

I appeal to the Remarker, whether this is not the only way of dealing with a Man who has been Educated from his Infancy in false Principles, confirm'd by vicious Habits, and the approbation of all his Companions, whether such a Man may not by Reflection and Reason be corrected, and convinc'd of the Natural Obligations which the Creator has laid on him, as a Rational, Sociable, and Dependent Creature ? This I doubt not the Remarker will allow, his Zeal for an *Innate Light* will not transport him so far as to put out the *Light of Reason*, that it may shine alone, and leave Men irrecoverably in the dark, in whom this Light of Conscience happens to be *Extinguish'd*: Tho' he says *he does not see by what Ratiocination we can collect what the Will of God is, unless we take in Natural Conscience for a distinction of Good and Evil*. I hope on farther consideration, and what I have before said on that Subject, he will not deny the consistency of our Duty to Reason, and the Evidence of it to all who diligently set themselves to know it; That wou'd indeed be an indignity to Mankind, and a great ingratitude to our Maker; But all who perceive the reasonableness of what is required of us, the necessity of it for the preservation or perfection of our Nature, all who read the will of God in his *Wisdom*, must acknowledge that he has not been thus wanting unto Men, but that all the Precepts of Natural Religion may be clearly

3d P. 5.

clearly known by the Light of Reason, to any one who sets himself to search. This being what I believe the Remarker will not think fit to deny, I take for granted, and desire him to consider, whether a Man, in whom the Dictates of Conscience (supposing them Innate) have been early obscur'd, or perverted, being brought to a knowledge of his Duty by Reason, or Reflection, whether I say this Man has not a sure foundation for Natural Religion, without taking in his Principle of Conscience for a distinction of Good and Evil? This he must grant, unless he will say that *General, obscure and indistinct notices* (for so he describes his Innate Principles) are a better foundation for Natural Religion, than clear and distinct Knowledge; which if it be too absurd to assert, the Remarker must own, notwithstanding his Zeal for *Innate Principles*, that those who deny them may have a sure foundation for Natural Religion, as long as the Precepts of it are consistent with, or Evident to the Light of Reason.

And farther I suppose the Remarker will very readily allow, that when a Man is thus brought by Reason to a true Sense of his Duty, his Conscience, tho' before perverted, will then be set right, and thenceforward Condemn or Acquit him, according as he obeys or not that Law which his Understanding has assented to, and this *without Ratiocination*, by an immediate affection of the Mind: But let him



him consider whether this be the effect of an Original impression on the Mind, anticipating all Reflection, or Ratiocination; or whether it does not plainly prove, that Conscience is nothing else but a Judgment which we make of our Actions, with reference to some Law, which we are perswaded ought to be the Rule of them. This I believe will, upon an unprejudic'd Examination, be found to be the true Notion of Natural Conscience, and the Best with regard to Religion (as Truth always is a surer support for it than the most Pious mistaken Notions) for this account cautions Men not to trust to a Peace of Conscience which may proceed from false Opinions; and leaves all its Authority in those who have had occasions of being rightly inform'd of their Duty.

Thus I have done with each particular Head of the Remarkers Enquiries, and I hope have said enough to convince him, that Mr. Lock's Principles of Humane understanding, give a sufficient security against such a System as he apprehends, a *Manichean God, a Mortal Soul, an Arbitrary Law of Good and Evil*, and any dangerous Inferences from Mr. Lock's Notion of *Cogitant Matter*, viz. *That God may, for any thing we know, give the Power of Cognition to some Systems of Matter*. For I have shewn that the Proofs of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, are equally conclusive without a Demonstrative certainty of the Souls *Immateriality*. And as to that other

2. R. p. 11.

3. R. p. 16.

Essay B. 4.  
C. 10.

other Difficulty with which the first Remarks conclude, concerning the Nature of God and his *Immateriality*, upon this concession, That Matter may be capable of Perception and Thought, Mr. *Lock* has so well confuted the *Materialists* on that Point, so strongly prov'd, that Cogitation cannot be the Power of Matter, or that the Supreme Cogitant Being cannot be Material, that I cannot imagine to what end the Remarker brings in those Arguments against the *Immateriality* of God, if he means as well to Religion, and Mr. *Lock*, as he would be thought to do.

P. 23.

But whatever he there meant, it seems he has repented upon farther thoughts, or better seen the force of Mr. *Lock*'s proofs that God is *Immaterial*; which he there fears will rise no higher than Probability, tho' he heartily wishes they may; but in his Third Letter, his judgment is brought over to his hearty wish, and he confesses that Mr. *Lock* very well refutes the *Materialist*, who would have but one single substance in the World, namely *Matter*. And to shew his sincerity and good will the more, he owns this where one would least expect it, when he is giving the worst insinuations he can of Mr. *Lock*'s Principles; But the manner of his doing it is an extraordinary mark of the kind intentions, and respect to Mr. *Lock*, which he professes, and which no body can doubt of, who observes how ingeniously he endeavours to fasten the Principles of

of *Deism* on Mr. *Lock*, by shewing that some of his Notions are not inconsistent with them; and that some of the Questions which he discusses may be rais'd upon their Principles, tho' none of them do necessarily depend upon those Principles; and a great part of his Essay is directly contrary to that which the Remarker says he cannot but think is the Mystery aim'd at all along, but conceal'd from us, viz.

*That the Soul of Man is not a distinct permanent substance.* Let the impartial judge

whether this be to argue fairly; or whether it does no look like a desire to make

Vide 2 R  
p. 12.

use of Names to no very fair purpose. But that I may not be suspected to have misrepresented the Remarkers way of imputing the Deists Principles to Mr. *Lock*, I will, as briefly as possible, run over the particulars which he compares to them.

*The grand Principle of Deism* (says he) 3 R. p. 23

is this, *There's one Infinite, Universal Spirit that actuates Matter always, without the Operation of particular Spirits; And if the Soul of Man be nothing but an influx from another Principle, not a distinct permanent Substance, whosoever goes upon this Principle, I do not wonder if he cannot allow Innate Ideas, or Practical Principles in the Soul; for there is no permanent Soul to imprint them upon.*

(*Ans.*) But may not one who does think the Soul a permanent Substance; doubt that it has any Ideas but what it received from Sensation and Reflection; because he is not conscious of any but what he can

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trace

trace to those Originals? And the Power or Faculties of receiving Ideas, no less require a permanent Substance to Exist in, than Ideas themselves. *Moreover* (says the Remarker) *upon that Hypothesis the Soul cannot be said to be Immortal.* And what is that, I pray, to Mr. Lock? Has he any where told us that the Soul cannot be said to be Immortal? Does he not frequently profess a stedfast belief that the Soul is Immortal? Has he not zealously contested that our ignorance of what kind of Substance the Soul is, does not at all weaken the assurances of its Immortality? Why then is this, That *the Soul cannot be said to be Immortal*, brought in as an opinion of Mr. Lock's, but at any rate to make that Position, *That the Soul is not a distinct Substance*, be suppos'd a Principle of his?

Essay, B. 4.

Reply to the  
Bishop of  
Worcester's  
2d Letter.

Furthermore (says the Remarker) in consequence of this Principle of Deism, and the Mortality of the Soul, great difficulties must needs arise to them about the Resurrection, How it can be the same Man, or the same Person, that rises again, when both the Body and the Soul are new; and this wou'd bring on nice disputes about the Notions of Identity, and Diversity, which accordingly we find discuss'd at large in the Essay, for their satisfaction, I suppose, that go upon those Principles. It may be so, But the Remarker must give me leave to suppose too, that those Notions are not discuss'd for their satisfaction alone, who go upon those Principles;



ciples; and the reason why I take the liberty to suppose so, is, because Mr. Lock determines the Ideas of *Identity* and *Diversity*, upon several very different Principles; and because those who do think the Soul a distinct permanent Substance, may have some difficulties about the *Resurrection*, and about the *Notions* of *Identity* and *Diversity*; for *Identity* of Substance will not determine it in all cases, as *Personal Identity*, and *Human Identity*, to those who take the Body into their Idea of *Man*; and for their satisfaction who place *Humane Identity* in the same *Immaterial Spirit*, united to such and such Particles of Matter, in such a Shape and Form, Mr. Lock shews how we may easily conceive the same Person at the *Resurrection*, tho' in a Body not exactly in make or parts the same he had here. But supposing with the Remarker, that Discourse was design'd for the satisfaction of those who go upon the Principles of *Deism*, that does not sure Intitle Mr. Lock to their Principles; and indeed these are a sort of Deists very well worth satisfying, whatever they think of the Soul, since they allow the *Resurrection*: I suppose they are of that Party which the Remarker tells *Postscript.* us will own both Natural and Reveal'd Religion. And to satisfy such Men how consistently with their own Notions, they may conceive the same Persons at the *Resurrection*, accountable for their Actions in this Life, is worthy of a good Man's pains, tho' he differs from them in their opinions

opinions of the Soul; and much more serviceable to Religion, than those can be (what ever zeal they pretend for it) who will not allow that the Resurrection, or a Future State, can be establish'd upon any Hypothesis but their own; for no doubt, if Men are convinc'd of a Future State, 'tis of no consequence upon what grounds they are so, their mistakes about the Substance of the Soul, will not endanger their Morals, or their Salvation; And if Mr. *Lack's* Discourse of *Identity* and *Diversity*, was design'd to resolve the difficulties that may arise about the Resurrection, that can only shew his concern to secure that Essential point upon every Man's Principles, since he determines the Ideas of *Identity* and *Diversity* upon several contrary suppositions; and therefore there can be no reason to conclude any one of them to be his opinion, more than another, unless he has declar'd in favour of one, which he has done two or three times in that Chapter for this, *That the Soul is one Individual, Immaterial Substance*, the direct contrary to that which the Remarker wou'd have thought to be his opinion.

Vide,  
S. 13. S. 25.

We come now to the next and last dispute which the Remarker mentions as arising from that Principle, *That the Soul is not a Substance distinct from God and Matter.* From this Position (he says) a Question springs up concerning the Powers of Matter, or whether Matter be not capable of Cogitation? I should rather think this Question pre-

preceded that Position; it seems more Rational, and Natural, in the ignorance Men are of ~~what the Soul is~~, first to enquire whether that Power of Cogitation which they perceive in themselves may not be communicated to Matter; and if they find no contradiction in it, (and upon that think fit to determine of the nature of a thing, which they cannot certainly know) thence to conclude, that the Soul is not a Substance distinct from Matter. But howsoever that be, it cannot be concluded, that those who make this Question go upon a Supposition *That the Soul is not a distinct permanent Substance*, which is the Principle the Remarker wou'd have suppos'd to be Mr. Lock's; The Question, as Mr. Lock makes it, is not whether our Cogitations are the operations of God, or of Matter; but whether God has given the Power of Cogitation to a Material, or an Immaterial Substance, and which way soever this Question is resolved, the Soul must equally be suppos'd a distinct permanent Substance; for a Material Substance is not less a Substance than an Immaterial.

But the fallacy by which that supposition, *That the Soul is not a distinct permanent Substance*, is imputed to Mr. Lock, upon his doubting whether the Soul may not be Material, lies in this, that supposing the Soul not to be a Substance distinct from Matter, is taken for the same thing, as supposing it not to be distinct from the Body, which are very different suppositions;

tions; and upon this fallacy it is concluded, that those who think the Soul may be *Material*, cannot suppose it to exist after the dissolution of the Body. But that one who thinks God may have given *Perception* and *Thought*; to some Systems of Matter dispos'd as he sees fit, may suppose this System *distinct from the Body*; and to continue in the same State of *Cogitation* when the *Body* is dissolved, we have for an Instance (not to mention many others) a no less eminent Philosopher than *Cicero*, who in all his enquiries about the Substance of the Soul, went not beyond that Matter of which the Heavens are made, *Aristotle's Quinta Essentia*; tho' he finds reasons to think it may be *Immortal* and survive the *Body*; and plainly distinguishes it from *Body*, taken for the sensible, organical parts of a Man, tho' there is nothing of *Immateriality* in all his considerations about the substance of the Soul.

This then is evident, that none of these Discourses in the Essay which the Remarker mentions, as agreeing with the notion of one *Universal Mind* operating according to different Systems of Matter, without any particular thinking Beings distinct from the *Universal*; None of them, I say, do necessarily depend upon, or terminate in that Supposition; and some of them do necessarily suppose the contrary: For if the Soul is not suppos'd a particular Substance, distinct from the *Universal Spirit*, to what purpose are any Questions Made or Resolv'd about



about the Resurrection? There is no ground for such an expectation, who can take account, or be accountable for actions done here, if they are all the operations of one Universal Spirit? And who but the Remarker cou'd find any consistency in that Supposition, with a Discourse to satisfy Men how they may conceive the same Persons at the Resurrection, and justly subject to Rewards and Punishments, whatever substance the Soul is, or of whatever Particles the Body is made up? No sort of Deists, or Sect of Men, that I know of, did ever reconcile these two opinions.

Those Sects which the Remarker says 12. P. 12. were noted for holding only one Universal Mind, consistently with themselves denied the Resurrection; and to such Men Mr. *Lock's* Discourse about *Identity* and *Diversity*, cou'd give no satisfaction in that Point, nor cou'd it be made upon their Principles. But I leave the Reader to judge what ground there is from any of the Particulars mention'd, for the Remarker to impute that opinion to Mr. *Lock*, and to think that the *Mystery* aim'd at all Ibid. along in an Essay, where upon every occasion he speaks of the Soul as a real distinct substance, in too many places to be instanced; and of Man as a free Agent, subject to an Eternal Retribution, according to his doings in this Life; and that so frequently, and so expressly, that 'tis impossible to declare his sentiments upon that grand Point (for

(for the Remarkers Esteem as he desires)  
more plainly than he has done; which, in-  
deed, is to effectuate a way of reasoning  
altogether opposite to those Notions, that  
I believe nobody will suspect it to be Mr.  
Lock's aim, but the Remarker. And he I  
hope, upon further reflection, will find  
an easier Key to decipher this Philosophy; and  
be as forward to own his mistakes of Mr.  
Lock's Principles, and wrong inferences  
from them, as he was to publish Remarks  
so injurious to him, upon *an entire Con-  
fession* and *gratuitous Supposition* of  
knowing, did ever reconcile those two  
opinions.

Those Sects which the Remarker says  
were noted for holding only one Universal  
Mind, consistently, and themselves denied  
the Reduction; and *in the*  
*Lock's Discourse* about *the*  
we could give no Reduction in that  
that not could be made upon their  
principles. But I leave the Reader to  
judge what ground there is from any of  
the Particulars mentioned, for the Re-  
marker to suppose that opinion for Mr. Lock  
and to what *the* *Lock's* *Lock's* *Lock's*  
only in an Essay, where upon every occasion  
he speaks of the soul as a real distinct sub-  
stance in too many places to be numbered;  
not of Man as a mere Agent, subject to in-  
ternal Reasons, according to his  
and in this; and that to irreconcilable  
and is explicitly, that is impossible to be  
that his sentiment upon that point  
(for)

The End.